

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_148288

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OUP—43—30-1-71—5,000

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No.

Accession No.

Author

Title

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

--	--	--	--

THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE

THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE

*An Introduction to the Study of
Contemporary Expansionist Policy of
Japan, Italy and Germany.*

By

MAHMUD HUSAIN, PH. D.

Reader in Modern History, University of Dacca.

DACCA

1937

All rights reserved.

First Edition, January, 1937

Printed in India by Trailokya Chandra Sur at the Asutosh Press,

Dacca,

and

Published by the Author, The University, Dacca.

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Preface	7
Introduction	9
Chapter I. The Expansion of Japan	17
Chapter II. The Expansion of Italy	93
Chapter III. The Expansion of Germany	171
Appendices	239

MAPS

I. Japan and China	<i>facing</i> 65
II. Italy in Africa	„ 145
III. The Former Colonies of Germany	„ 192
IV. Central and Eastern Europe	„ 208

ا-تساب

میں یہ مختصر سی کتب اپنے بھائی اور استاد
ڈاکٹر ذاکر حسن خان صاحب کی خدمت میں پیش
کرنے کی عزت حاصل کرنا ہوں جن کی زبان اور قلم
نے ہمارے ملک میں بین الاقوامی سیست سے خصوصی
دلچسپی پیدا کر دی ہے۔ گرمین نے ان سے اجازت
فہم لیں لی مگر مجھے یقین ہے کہ وہ اسے شرف قبولت
بخشیں گے *

PREFACE

Whoso writes the history of his own time must expect to be attacked for everything he has said, and for everything he has not said : but those little drawbacks should not discourage a man who loves truth and liberty, expects nothing, fears nothing, asks nothing, and limits his ambition to the cultivation of letters —Voltaire

The publication of this book, in spite of its many shortcomings, perhaps does not require an apology. Japan's rapid advance on the mainland of Asia, Italy's conquest of Abyssinia and Nazi Germany's ambitions not only to expand towards the east but to find a place in the colonial sun are striking manifestations of expansionist activity. It is hoped that a work in which an attempt has been made to explain the imperialist policies of these countries may prove to be of some use to the reader and may help him to understand an important aspect of the complicated international relations of the present time.

There are certain paragraphs in the book which occur in my articles published in the *Calcutta Review* and the *Modern Review* : I have refrained from disturbing them, because, in the words of a famous

PREFACE

historian, "where it happens that the same thing has to be said at the same length, it is an affectation to vary the words."

From among the numerous books and journals in English and German which I have consulted, I should like to make particular and grateful mention of Toyubee's *Survey of International Affairs*, Wheeler-Bennett's *Documents on International Affairs* and the publications of the League of Nations and the German Colonial Society.

My thanks are due to a small group of friends who have encouraged and helped me in the preparation of this work, particularly to Professor M. Hasan, Professor H. L. Dey and Dr. W. H. A. Shadani.

Dacca, January, 1937.

Mahmud Husain

INTRODUCTION

For some time past it has been the fashion to divide the industrially advanced nations of the world into two categories, the *Haves* and the *Have-nots*. Great Britain, France, U.S.A., Russia and certain smaller countries such as Belgium, Holland and Portugal are supposed to be satiated Powers, because they either possess extensive empires, or like the U.S.A. and Russia, are themselves very large and rich. To the category of the *Have-nots* belong, above all, Japan, Italy and Germany.¹ Although the desire for colonial expansion is not peculiar to these countries, it is particularly strong among them.

There is much that is common to the history of these countries; and there are many points of resemblance in the situation in which they find themselves to-day. When these countries became industrialized and strong, they found that other nations had stolen a march over them and had divided among themselves all the prized territories of the world. All the three countries joined the World War, though not on the same side, principally for the sake of territorial expansion. Germany was

¹ For their area and population see Appendices I and II.

INTRODUCTION

defeated, and, instead of obtaining new possessions, she lost all that she had acquired in difficult circumstances. Italy and Japan belonged to the camp of victors, but even their expectations were not fulfilled and they felt that they had been 'betrayed' at Versailles. To-day Japan, Italy and Germany are confronted with the same problems. There is the same 'population pressure' and there are similar economic needs. Moreover, all the three countries are motivated by the same autocratic and militaristic ideas.

There are two often-repeated explanations of the tendency to expansion in industrial States displayed so strikingly at the present time in Japan, Italy and Germany. One explanation is given by the 'Geopoliticians', the other by the 'Historical Materialists'. The essence of the theory of 'geopolitics', propounded by Ratzel, Kjellén and Haushofer, is that certain geographical factors such as climate, size, position and soil of a country determine its politics. According to this theory it is only natural that Japan, Italy and Germany should follow a policy of territorial expansion.¹ The geopoliticians agree with Mussolini that for these countries, "the

1. The famous German periodical 'Zeitschrift für Geopolitik', edited by Professor Haushofer, is the mouth-piece of the geopoliticians. The English historian Buckle is to geopoliticians what Marx is to historical materialists.

INTRODUCTION

choice is between foreign expansion and domestic explosion”.

The Historical Materialists, led by Lenin, Trotsky and the greatest of Bolshevik theorists, Bukharin, denounce the writings of Kjellén and others as “childish prattle,”¹ and assert that Imperialism is the last and inevitable stage in the development of capitalism. The latest stage of the system of capitalistic economy is that in which surplus capital seeks new fields for investment in foreign countries because of the ever-diminishing returns at home. These writers denounce imperialism, but to them it is an evil which cannot be avoided under the capitalist system.

Both these theories seem to be one-sided. Although it cannot be denied that geographical factors exercise a profound influence on politics, yet they cannot explain all political movements. The insular position of Great Britain may explain many but not all aspects of British national life. Similarly, imperialism has sometimes nothing to do with capitalism. In fact imperialism is decidedly older than capitalism. Even to-day we notice that the export of surplus capital is not always directly connected with the acquisition of colonies. Italy, for example, has no capital to invest in Abyssinia ;

1. Bukharin in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 14, no. 4.

INTRODUCTION

and the capital which flows from highly industrialized countries does not necessarily flow to their own colonies.

There are certain other economic arguments in favour of expansion which are so often heard in Japan, Italy and Germany and are considered as so many justifications for the line along which they are moving.

Colonies are considered as outlets for the surplus population of the densely populated countries. It is also said that imperial possessions ensure access to essential raw materials and foodstuffs, and they serve as markets for the industrial output of the mother country. Moreover, for certain classes of people in the mother country, expansion means new opportunities to govern and to secure a large number of well-paid administrative posts.

The idea of the economic utility of colonies has been questioned by many writers in those countries which are fortunate in possessing large empires, particularly in Great Britain. The English publicists argue, with the help of statistics, that the colonies do not pay. Trade, they assert, no longer follows the flag, and colonial possessions do not always have a direct bearing on the population problem. Similarly, industrial States possessing large empires

INTRODUCTION

do not get all the raw materials and foodstuffs from their own possessions.¹

It cannot be denied that there is some truth in these criticisms of the economic justification for expansion. Colonies, however, are not quite so worthless as they are depicted to be. Otherwise, why should the *Haves* object to a redistribution of the colonial world. The claims of the *Have-nots* could be at once amicably settled if the colonies, instead of being assets, were so many encumbrances. But at the same time we should not forget that "nations cannot solely live on economic considerations". Many non-economic factors influence their policies.

Colonies, for instance, are coveted by States because they can supply them with man power, a lesson which European countries learnt particularly during the World War. How can France with a population of 40 millions be a match for Germany with its 65 million people, without the help of her colonial troops? Strategic and political considerations often compel States to extend their dominion to territories which are otherwise of no value.

1 *The Economist*, October 26. and November 16, 1935. Many American writers hold the same views. See Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, Schumann, *International Politics*, and Langer, *Critique of Imperialism in Foreign Affairs*, vol. 14, no. 1.

INTRODUCTION

It is natural that the history of a nation should also influence its policy. The Fascists of Italy have been greatly influenced by the Roman tradition ; and the conquest of Abyssinia was also due among other things to the bitter memory of the defeat of Adowa (1896). When Hitler speaks of Germany's urgent need for colonies, he particularly emphasizes that "the moral stigma of deprivation of colonies must be removed".

Independent nations very often have the ambition to become World Powers. Some of them would risk their all for this greatness. "Germany", proclaims Hitler, "must either become a World Power or cease completely to exist". The possession of colonies is considered to be an essential attribute of greatness. It is true that there are Powers with vast colonial domains, Belgium for instance, which do not belong to the category of Great Powers, and there are others such as Russia which are considered great even though they do not possess colonial empires ; but for most people the greatness of a country and territorial expansion go together.

Patriotism and national pride demand a place in the sun, irrespective of its political and economic advantages. "Many a man", says Norman Thomas, "without six feet of earth in which to be buried

INTRODUCTION

is swollen with pride because his country 'owns' an empire."¹

As a rule autocratic form of government with its heroic conception of life and its armaments and eulogy of war also helps in creating in the minds of the people the desire to expand. In those countries which are governed autocratically, one hears not infrequently of their 'right' to subjugate other nations

When governments find themselves confronted with serious economic and social problems, they often turn to expansion. Aggressive imperialist policy has proved on many an occasion the surest method of distracting the people's minds from domestic ills.

Further, it cannot be denied that many nations honestly believe in their civilizing mission. It may be that when politicians talk of their duty to confer the benefits of civilization on primitive and backward countries, they do not always mean what they say. In fact they often remind us of the saying that "man was given a tongue to hide his thoughts". When Mussolini asserted that the object of the Italian annexation of Abyssinia was the abolition of slavery, no one believed him. But it is difficult to imagine whole nations consisting of hypocrites only. When an average citizen of

1. *The Challenge of War.*

INTRODUCTION

Great Britain or France speaks of the "white man's burden" and of the good that his country's rule has done to the Negroes of Africa, he is undoubtedly sincere.

Finally, the contention, though somewhat exaggerated, is not altogether false that there are occasions when States conquer other territories, not because of their economic value and other advantages but merely for the sake of conquest.¹ Here imperialism becomes an end in itself.

In the pages that follow an attempt has been made to describe the present Quest for Empire somewhat in detail from the points of view mentioned above.

2. Joseph Schumpeter, *Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen*.

CHAPTER I

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

A review of the so-called "continental" policy of Japan, by which is meant the expansion of the country on the mainland, should naturally begin with the consideration of certain important facts regarding the Japanese situation. We should examine permanent factors as well as recent happenings which determine present Japanese policy. Perhaps the most important problem of Japan is the economic problem ; Japan suffers, particularly, from over-population, and shortage of raw materials, minerals and food stuffs.

To-day the population of Japan proper—excluding the imperial possessions, Korea, Formosa and Manchukuo—is estimated to be about 70 million. In this connection it may be of interest to know that less than a century ago the population of Japan was just over 25 million. From the middle of the eighteenth to the

middle of the nineteenth century the population remained on a uniform level. It remained almost stationary in spite of the efforts of the state to increase it for political reasons, and in spite of the exhortations of the Church. The Church asked people to leave more children to pray for the souls of their parents !¹ But there were too many famines and epidemics during this period which prevented an increase in the population. With the modernization of Japan during the second half of the nineteenth century, however, its population began to increase by the proverbial leaps and bounds. It was 26 million in 1846, 36 million in 1882, 46 million in 1903, 59 million in 1925, and at present it is estimated to be about 70 million. This extraordinary increase in population was the natural outcome of the transformation of mediaeval Japan into a modern industrial state. For many years the increase was most

1. Nitobe, *Japan*, p. 266.

welcome, as new Japan was in need of urban workers. It was the "optimum population" that was growing. But ultimately there came a stage when the increasing numbers could not be absorbed by the industries. Now the growth ought to have stopped. But unfortunately for China and perhaps for many other countries—who knows?—the Japanese continued to increase at what has been aptly called an "Oriental" birth rate of 32.92/1000, whereas, because of their advanced position in the world of science, they had now a "European" death rate of 17.72/1000.¹ The annual increase in the population of Japan is about 900,000 on average.² In point of density of population, Japan stands fifth in the world, as the density in Belgium, Holland, Germany and England is greater than in Japan, while in Italy it

1. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 2.

2. *Japanese Trade and Industry* by Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau (1936), p. 57.

is about equal. But if in calculating the density only the cultivated area is taken into consideration, it will be found that, in comparison with other highly industrialised and extremely thickly populated countries, the Japanese ratio is exceptionally high. According to this calculation the density per kilometer would be 661 in Belgium, 865 in England, 308 in Italy and 1,156 in Japan.'

This huge Japanese population is to be supported by a country which is not only small in size—the total area of Japan proper being 147,611 sq. miles—but which is very poor in natural resources. Japan proper is mainly mountainous, the cultivated territory being only 16% of the total area. Japan has to import not only all the important minerals and raw materials for her industries—iron, coal and cotton, for instance—but also a certain percentage of food stuffs.

1. *Japanese Trade and Industry*, p. 56.

2. *Statesman's Year Book* (1936), p. 1073.

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

Japan is a great industrial country. But, curiously, before the conquest of Manchuria she lacked all the requirements of modern industrial development.

A glance at the following table will show how dependent Japan has been on the imports of raw materials and food stuffs from foreign countries :—

Imports of Raw Materials and Food Stuffs in 1929, (in 1,000 Yen).¹

Raw Materials

Raw materials for the textile industry including cotton and wool... 710,090	Wood and timber	88,838
Ores & metals 269,731	Fodder	24,645
Crude & heavy oils ... 46,603	Oil yielding materials	30,778
Crude rubber 33,886	Phosphorite	13,455
Coal ... 42,979	Sulphate of ammonia	48,086
Oil cake 75,919	Pulp	13,485
	Hides and leather	20,103

(1) *Japanese Trade and Industry*, Part VI, Ch. XXX.

THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE

Food Stuffs

Beans and		Sugar	31,160
peas	78,746	Indian corn	3,672
Wheat	70,896	Meat	7,878
Salt	4,415		

No doubt other great industrial countries, such as Great Britain, Holland and Belgium have also to import raw materials from outside ; but, then, they possess vast empires from where to import ; and for their surplus populations there is ample room for expansion within their own imperial territories. But Japan's imperial possessions before the conquest of Manchuria were insignificant in comparison with those of the great colonial nations of the West. Even Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, not to speak of Great Britain and France, possessed greater Empires than did Japan. While the colonial Empire of Belgium was eighty times as large as the mother country,

and of Great Britain over one hundred times, Japanese possessions were not even as large as Japan proper, the ratio of the mother country to the dependencies being 1.2 to 1.0.

What could be the possible solutions of the Japanese economic problem? On examination it seems there are five remedies, if the policy of inaction be not regarded as one. Such a policy we may at once dismiss as wholly inapplicable to a nation which believes in human effort and which can never accept the fatalistic idea which is completely foreign to its mind. Modern Japan, so powerful, so advanced in science and so ambitious, cannot be expected to adopt this policy in face of a real danger to the already low standard of living of her people, if not to their very existence. The problem has to be faced and a solution has to be found. As pointed out before, there are several possible solutions. To begin with there is the policy of restriction of

population by means of birth control. Then comes the policy of pure colonisation or emigration ; or the Japanese may concentrate on the improvement of agriculture and expansion of trade. Japan even without a colonial empire may perhaps feed a much larger population than she has at present, and maintain a decent standard of living provided she is able to increase the food supplies by improvements in the methods of agriculture and extension of cultivated areas, and provided she is in a position to expand her industries and trade. Lastly, there is the policy of empire-building.

1. Restriction of Population

In the present age of Planned Economy it should not be impossible to restrict the population of a country. No wonder birth control is occasionally suggested as a remedy for the Japanese problem. It is, however, not a solution of the imme-

diate difficulties. It may have its effect only in the distant future. If resort is had to birth control on a nation-wide scale—a problem by itself—the problem of over-population may become less acute in future, but this remedy will be of little help to the people of today. Besides practical considerations there are moral and political objections which make the task of the champion of this system in Japan extremely difficult. When publicists of other countries suggest birth control to the Japanese, they suspect their motive and consider it as a “foreign plot to undermine Japan’s prestige.” Religion in Japan, as elsewhere, is very hostile towards its adoption, though for reasons different from those advanced by other religions. The most effective argument, however, against birth control is its ineffectiveness.

1. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 2.

2. Emigration

Past experience shows that the Japanese are not good colonizers. As a rule they do not like to leave their country even when other countries offer great opportunities. The result is that even Japanese possessions, not to speak of other countries, have not been able to attract many people from Japan. After several decades of Japanese rule, only 2.5 per cent of the people of Korea and 5 per cent of Formosa are members of the ruling nation. However paradoxical it may sound, it is a fact, as has been pointed out by a writer, that the number of Koreans who have made Japan their home since 1910 exceeds the number of the Japanese who have emigrated to Korea during the same period.¹

It is not easy to overcome the natural reluctance of the Japanese people to leave their fatherland, but

1. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 2.

there are other even more serious difficulties. Had the Japanese been free to emigrate in large numbers to Siberia, China, America, the British dominions or the Dutch East Indies, the policy of Japan would have been perhaps very different from what it is to-day. But that is not possible.

The Siberian climate, even if there was no other hindrance, practically prohibits any Japanese settlement in the region. Nature has debarred the Japanese from this territory. As regards China, apart from the fact that it is on the whole an already over-populated country, low-paid Chinese labour makes Japanese immigration economically fruitless. The Japanese, despite their own low wage standard, cannot compete with Chinese workers in the labour market. In fact, partly due to this reason Japanese emigration to Korea has been negligible. And the standard of living of the Chinese is

certainly not improving, if not actually deteriorating.

Another territory for emigration is South America, specially Brazil. Here the Japanese in the past were welcomed for various reasons but mainly because of their low wage standard. For the last few years, however, the quota admissible into South America has been strictly limited and in Brazil, particularly since the passing of constitutional amendment in May 1934, the door is practically closed.

As regards the United States, when Japan came into contact with them, their policy was to encourage immigration. Many people from Japan went over to the U.S.A. during the last three decades of the nineteenth century. But in the course of time, as their population grew, there arose a serious friction between the two countries over this very question. Ultimately in 1907 a "Gentlemen's Agreement" was concluded.

Japan voluntarily undertook to restrict the migration of Japanese labourers. Since then Japanese emigration to the States had been small, but since 1924 when the Exclusion Act was passed, and when the U.S.A. adopted a "racial Monroe Doctrine" it has been wholly stopped¹.

The Dutch Indies and Philippines are similarly closed to the Japanese.

Last of all there are the British dominions, specially Australia with the adjoining islands. For many reasons Australia is most suitable for Japanese colonization. Australia has much undeveloped territory and considerable mineral wealth. But the population of this continent in proportion to its size and natural wealth is very small indeed. Australia with eleven times as large a territory as that of the whole Japanese Empire, excluding Manchukuo, has less

1. Tsurumi in his *Present Day Japan* describes how deeply this Act has wounded the feelings of the Japanese people.

than 1/14th of its population'. And even this small population is concentrated almost wholly in half a dozen cities. If we take Northern Australia alone—a territory in which Japan should be specially interested because of its nearness and the virgin state of its soil—we find that it is a territory almost without a people. The population of the whole of Northern Australia does not exceed a few thousand souls. But in spite of this “boundless emptiness”, in spite of the fact that Australia has “more trees than men,” she has closed her doors to all coloured peoples. “It is a great pity”, truly observes a Japanese writer, “that artificial laws of other nations are standing between Japan and her natural expansion abroad”.¹ New Zealand, the Dutch East Indies and Canada have similarly closed their doors to Japanese immigration.

1. *Statesman's Year Book* (1936).

2. Quoted by Etherton, *The Pacific : A Forecast* p. 86.

This brief review of Japan's chances of emigration shows clearly that to-day, due partly to Japanese temperament, but largely to the policy of the countries concerned, emigration cannot be considered as a solution of the Japanese population problem. Japan, therefore, must find out some other remedy.

3. Extension and Improvement of Agriculture

The possibilities of improving the technique of agriculture and of extending arable land have been examined by competent men. As regards the extension of cultivated areas it has been pointed out that in Japan proper during the last fifty years an area corresponding to about 35% of the previously cultivated land has been converted into arable land, as shown in the following Table' :—

		1880	1934	Rate of increase.
Paddy fields	...	2,599	3,192	23 %
Upland farms	...	1,835	2,796	52 %
Total	...	4,434	5,988	35 %

1. *Japanese Trade and Industry*, Ch. XI.

During the last half century much of the waste land has been with great difficulty converted into arable land. There is now little prospect of increasing agricultural production in this manner, as all land that was at all suitable for cultivation is now being cultivated.

As regards the improvement of agricultural methods it has been suggested that there are possibilities in this direction.

If advanced and more scientific methods are employed, perhaps a 20 per cent. increase in agricultural output may be effected. Japan has in fact already taken up this work seriously. But even if she succeeds in increasing the agricultural returns by 20 per cent. it would not suffice for the rapid increase in the population. It has been estimated that by improvement and extension Japan can at best add the equivalent of 75,000 acres yearly to total agricultural production. "This is inadequate, however,

not merely because the maximum yield per acre is being rapidly approached, but because 142,000 acres must be added each year to meet the rice requirements alone of the annual increase in population'.¹

4. Expansion of Trade

Another alternative for Japan is to concentrate attention on the development of industries and expansion of trade in countries in no way politically dependent upon her.

In this connection if we look at the most important industrial and commercial nations of the world, we notice that some of them—Great Britain, France, Holland and Belgium—possess extensive empires. There are others—U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.—which are themselves large geographical units and for their prosperity they are not so much dependent upon foreign markets and sources of

1. Hindmarch in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 266.

supply for raw materials. But, leaving aside Germany and Italy, which are after building up empires, there are other industrial countries which neither possess colonial empires, nor do they consist of large areas, yet are found in a flourishing condition. Norway and Sweden are cited as typical examples of such countries. The secret of their prosperity, it is said, lies in their own efficiency and in their complete detachment from the dissensions of the world. They honestly follow a policy of peace. It is no exaggeration to say that, thanks to the flourishing state of their industries and commerce, they are economically better off than many of the imperialist nations. Why should not Japan adopt the same policy ?

The answer to this question is that Japan—whether by its own free choice or not is immaterial—has already given this policy a trial. From 1922 to 1931 when Japan was being governed by

liberal statesmen and when the merchant class was in control of government, she consistently followed a policy of "commercial expansion" and "political good neighbourliness".¹ During this period Japan tried to be on friendly terms with China, not always an easy task. She showed great self-restraint in face of the unprovoked and not deserved Exclusion Act of 1924 passed by the U.S.A. She allowed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to lapse. In many other ways Japan "gave impressive evidence of her will to peace".² During these years her supreme aim seems to have been the further development of her industries and the expansion of trade, in order to provide means of livelihood for her growing population. The most prominent statesmen of Japan gave their blessings to this policy. And it must be admitted that for a few years, until about 1925, the

1. *Survey of International Affairs* 1931, p. 400.

2. *ibid.*

policy was successful. But in 1926, that is to say even before the World Depression set in, Japanese international trade began to slacken, and in every successive year the condition turned from bad to worse. The reasons for the decline were two: protective policy of other nations and the attacks of Chinese nationalism, which though directed against the interested powers in general, specially hit Japan, and took the form of boycott. Then came the world Economic Depression, the last straw on the camel's back, and the consequent social uneasiness. The following table explains why the policy of peaceful economic penetration became discredited in Japan and was abandoned in 1931. The years 1933 and 1934 did show a great increase in Japanese Export Trade. This was, however, due to the fall in the value of the Yen and therefore it is somewhat misleading. It must also be pointed out that the increase led to further drastic

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

restrictions on Japanese goods in most countries of the world. Today there is hardly any country that has not imposed fresh 'dumping' duties on Japanese goods.

JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL TRADE¹

(In millions of Yen)

Year.	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931
Imports.	1943	2407	2487	2305	2099	2133	2169	1507	1206
Exports.	1409	1761	2220	1972	1912	1909	2100	1430	1118

5. Empire-Building

We have discussed the possible methods of the solution of the Japanese problem. They have been complete failures in the eyes of the Japanese people. The only method that remains for the Japanese is to acquire political and economic control of foreign territories. These territories should be such

1. League of Nations Memoranda on International Trade quoted in the *Survey of International Affairs*, 1931, p. 402.

as would serve as markets for Japanese finished goods. They should constitute sources of supply for the required raw materials and fuel. The Japanese should be able to invest their capital profitably in these territories, and so far as possible exclusively exploit them economically. Unfortunately, exclusive economic exploitation is not possible without political domination. In short Japan is in need of a country which should be to her what India and other dependencies have been to Great Britain. Geographers and historians have noticed many points of resemblance between Great Britain and Japan. The resemblance, however, was till recently absent in one important respect. Whereas Great Britain possessed more than a quarter of the earth's surface, the outside possessions of 'the Britain of the East', before the conquest of Manchuria, were comparatively insignificant. It would have been surprising if the Japanese—

universally recognized as the masters of the art of imitation—had not imitated Great Britain in this respect as well.

The Japanese in recent years have adopted a definite policy of subjugating their neighbours, not merely because of economic reasons, which are formidable in themselves, but also because this policy is in conformity with their general outlook on life and specially with the present attitude of the younger generation.

The Japanese have been a martial nation from olden times. We need not discuss the circumstances which have made them a martial people—their insular position has been perhaps the greatest contributory factor¹—but their militarist character is undeniable : and even more important is their mentality.

The Japanese consider themselves to be the direct descendants of the Sun-

1. Ballard, *Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan*.

Goddess. They claim that they are the "Children of the Gods", and that they are the only race on earth that can make this claim. It is a part of their creed that members of other races are barbarians. The Japanese attitude towards the foreigner, in spite of extreme outwardly politeness, is of contempt and suspicion. The belief in their own superiority, irrespective of economic needs, is also responsible for a desire on their part to subjugate other peoples. The Japanese believe that they are of divine origin, and that it is their right and duty to govern others.

A few years ago the Chinese newspapers of Canton published an interesting document¹. According to these newspapers the Emperor of Japan, in the year 1926, asked the then Premier, Baron Tanaka, to prepare a plan of

1. The Document has also been mentioned in Wheeler-Bennett's *Documents on International Affairs* (1932).

Japanese expansion abroad, for the future guidance of Japanese governments. The Premier prepared a plan after one year's careful study of the international situation and submitted it to the Emperor. This imperialist programme has been divided into six periods. First of all it is proposed to take Manchuria and Mongolia, for reasons not far to seek ; then (2) the valley of the Yangtse, the richest and the most populous Chinese territory ; after which (3) is the turn of South China ; then (4) of Indo-China ; and (5) of Dutch East Indies and Philippines ; and lastly (6) of India ! Detailed suggestions are given as to the means which should be adopted in bringing every one of these territories under control, most of the suggestions being based on lessons of history, specially that of British India. The authenticity of the document may of course be challenged ; and let us hope that the programme will never be fulfilled ! It cannot be denied, however,

that India figures largely in the calculations of the militarists of Japan.

Leaving aside hidden schemes, there are open pronouncements. General Araki, the idol of the youth of Japan and one of the principal organizers of the Manchurian invasion, clearly defined the 'mission' of Japan in a speech before the General Staff :—

“What is the present state of the East ? India with its population of 300,000,000 lives in dire misery under Britain's oppressive rule. There is not a vestige of liberty left in the fertile plains of Central Asia and Siberia. Mongolia, that land of peace has become a second Central Asia. The countries of the Far East are the object of pressure on the part of white races. But awakened Japan can no longer tolerate further tyranny and oppression at their

hands...As a divine country in the Eastern Seas and the senior nation of Asia, Japan's aspirations are great and her responsibility is heavy".

An interesting book has been recently published by Lt. Commander Tota Ishimaru, *'Japan Must Fight Britain'*, which throws light on Japanese ambitions with regard to India. In the words of this author, "the inhabitants of India are burning to throw off the yoke of the foreign oppressor". He explains fully his scheme about the conquest of India.

Pronouncements such as these leave no room for doubt that the Japanese are looking forward to a time when their hegemony over Asia will be an accomplished fact. It is the "Yellow Man's Burden"! Japan may not, probably will not, conquer other parts of Asia as

1. *The Japan Weekly Chronicle*, 16th March, 1933, quoted by O'Conroy, *The Menace of Japan*, p. 261f.

she has conquered Manchuria and the adjacent territories, but she is not going to be satisfied with anything short of the dominant position in the East. The Japanese regard themselves as the natural leaders of Asia and they believe they are entrusted with the task of protecting this continent. How can they shirk their "responsibility" !

Let us now look at the problem from another angle. If we examine Japanese history, it would seem that the present Japanese policy is a natural outcome of past developments. Modern Japanese history is the most extraordinary record of the transformation of an insignificant people into an imperialistic nation. Once the Japanese had adopted Western fashions in administration, sanitation, engineering and warfare, and consequently become powerful, they began to feel the need of overseas possessions. China was near at hand. China, being weak and divided, fell an easy prey to

the aggrandizement of foreign nations, including the Japanese. In 1894 there was a war between China and Japan. This may be regarded as the first important imperialist attempt on the part of the Japanese, although even before that date Japan had acquired numerous small islands. For instance in 1875, only seven years after the Meiji Restoration, the Kuriles, a chain of thirty islands lying to the north-east, were annexed. Two years later the Bonin Islands, twenty-seven in number, were acquired. In 1879 the Lu Chus were taken possession of, which form an archipelago of fifty-five islands, the soil of which is very rich and fertile. The Volcano Islands adjoining the Bonin Islands were annexed in 1891. Then the Sino-Japanese War (1894-96) disclosed that China was the "Sick Man" of the Far East. People spoke of the "impending break-up" of China. Western Powers rushed to the Far East in their

mad greed for new territories. The partition of China seemed to be just a question of time. The success of Japan in this War would have been even more complete but for the interference of other powers, particularly of Russia. Even then by the Treaty of Shimonoseki Japan acquired Formosa, an extremely fertile island, specially suitable for the production of sugar. Unlike other previous Japanese acquisitions, Formosa was a purely Chinese island, and even to-day 94 per cent of its people are Chinese. China had also to cede the Pescadores Islands and to recognize the independence of Korea, which meant that the Japanese could now dominate Korea. But because of the joint action of Russia, Germany and France, Japan was compelled to give up all claims over the Liaotung Peninsula, which by the same treaty had been ceded by China. It was not due to humanitarian reasons that these three powers had come

forward to champion the cause of weak China. As the history of their later relations with that country shows, their real motive was different, and they soon got the reward of their 'assistance' to China.

Of the Powers that were at the time taking advantage of the weakness of China, Russia appeared to be in a very favourable position. Japan was not yet strong enough to challenge single-handed the Western Powers on the mainland. The growing power of Russia and the mutual danger of a conflict with that country led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Perhaps the most important provision of this treaty was this: "Should either contracting power become involved in a conflict with any third power, the other would exert its influence to prevent others from joining in hostilities against its ally. Should, however, any third power intervene, it should be the duty of the

other contracting power to come to the assistance of its ally, and to maintain war in common."

That this alliance was very significant for the strengthening of Japanese position goes without saying. The treaty, which was to last for five years in the first instance, was the first of its kind concluded between an Oriental power and one of the leading nations of the West.

In 1904 came the Russo-Japanese War. The war resulted in a great victory for the land of the Rising Sun. Japan secured from Russia the Southern portion of Sakhalin and the Kwantung Leased Area, apart from the South Manchuria Railway. Special economic rights were granted to Japan in Korea, by far the largest possession of Japan before the conquest of Manchuria with an area of 85,613 sq. miles and a population of 13 million at that time and of 20 million at present. Formal annexation

tion came in 1910. The consequence of Japanese success against Russia was that Japan at once became a World Power. But in spite of this success she still valued British friendship. And the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth showed that Great Britain on her side was also anxious to be on friendly terms with a power whose prestige was "a thing to conjure with throughout all Asia." The Alliance was renewed for a second time in 1911, and it was in force on the eve of the World War.

Consequently Japan joined the Allies. She reaped a fairly large harvest as a result of the War. Without much effort and with little sacrifice Japan defeated Germany in the Pacific and conquered all the German possessions, including Shantung. Then she turned towards China and finally, after the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, towards Russia. The

well-known Twenty-one Demands were presented in 1915, the object of which was to convert China into a Japanese protectorate. In spite of the support of the interested powers China had no option but to accept the substance of these Demands. The Demands, as well as her attitude towards Russia, revealed the true nature of Japan's expansionist policy in the Far East. But the Western Powers were not in a position to check the Japanese advance in China. In fact in the year 1917 (by the Lansing-Ishii Agreement concluded on November 3,) the U.S.A. themselves recognized that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries" and that "Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." But the efforts of Japan to extend her dominion to the neighbouring territories, which had been successful during the War, because of

the preoccupation of other powers elsewhere, were effectively neutralized first by the Paris Peace Conference and then by the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

Like Italy Japan came out of the Peace Conference of Paris a dissatisfied nation. Most of her demands *vis-a-vis* China were not accepted. Still Japan was made the lease-holder of Germany's naval base at Kiouchau. She succeeded to all the economic concessions formerly enjoyed by Germany in the populous Shantung Peninsula. She acquired an extensive "sphere of influence" in Southern Manchuria and she received a mandate—a disguised form of possession, specially when it belongs to category 'C'—over the formerly German owned islands in the Pacific comprising the Marianne, Caroline and Marshall groups. These islands are valuable for Japan not only for economic but for strategic reasons. For as a result, the Philippines and Guam have

been practically isolated and are at the mercy of the Japanese navy. Japan has been able to tighten her grip on the communications between China and the outside world. Having been disappointed at the verdict of the Peace Conference Japan embarked on a huge naval building programme in order to realize her ambitions on the mainland. On her side Great Britain by this time had begun to feel that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was being exploited by Japan to her own exclusive advantage. The Americans openly said that "while the Alliance lasted, the hands of Great Britain were tied as far as Japan's aggressive policy on the mainland was concerned." They accused Great Britain of forsaking the policy of the Open Door, and of being responsible for Japanese expansionist policy. It was thought to be in the interest of both the English-speaking peoples to call a halt to the growth of Japan's prestige and power

lest she should oust both the nations from the Far East. Japan was now claiming special privileges in China, and to enforce her will she was rapidly increasing her armaments and expanding her navy. It was in order to settle these problems that the Washington Conference was called towards the end of 1921.

As a result of the Conference Japan had to give up, at least for the time being, her ambitious programme of political domination over the Chinese continent. The Shantung Peninsula was to be transferred from Japan to China. As a result of the Nine Power Treaty she had to accept the principle of the Open Door and had to forego the claim for an exclusive control of China. She, along with other signatories, agreed not only to respect the sovereignty and independence and territorial integrity of China but also "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges

which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states." (Art. I, Part. 4 of the Nine Power Pact, Feb., 1922. Parties : Great Britain, U.S.A., Japan, China, France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, and Italy.) The Anglo-Japanese Alliance came to an end. The termination of this alliance has been considered a master stroke of international diplomacy. Japan as a result became diplomatically isolated. She had to accept an inferior position in the naval sphere. A ratio of 5 : 5 : 3 was fixed for the war navies of Great Britain, U. S. A. and Japan respectively.

Japan accepted the terms of the Washington Treaty because at this stage she was not powerful enough to challenge the combined strength of Chinese nationalism and Anglo-American determination. For Japan the time had not yet come to strike. She had to wait for

the favourable moment. She temporarily gave up the expansionist policy and adopted the policy of peaceful economic penetration of the Asiatic countries. The policy, as we have already pointed out, appeared to be successful for a few years. From 1926 onwards, however, there was a continuous decline in Japanese international trade, largely due to restrictions imposed by the governments concerned, and not the least due to Chinese boycott. With the coming of economic distress, the influence of the extreme militarists began to increase. The old aristocratic and military groups became alarmed at the spread of revolutionary ideas and they had now some justification in saying that the policy of conciliation followed for a decade had borne no fruit. They now demanded the adoption of an aggressive imperialist policy.

This military party now found support among the capitalists who had been their

great opponents but who had now begun to feel the disastrous effect of foreign restrictions. Political power was now snatched from the bourgeois politicians and parliamentary leaders by the military and naval authorities. They became the supreme masters of the land. They made and unmade ministries, and generally imposed their will upon the Civil Government. The peculiar constitution of Japan also assisted them in the establishment of their supremacy. For the Japanese Emperor is the supreme commander of the various forces and the Chiefs of Staff have the right to advise him, directly. Moreover according to the Japanese constitution the ministers for the Navy and Army have to be appointed from among senior naval and military officers, respectively.

Chinese weakness itself invites invasion. The Japanese contention that China has been so far unable to establish a strong central government and to main-

tain law and order and has therefore been a disturbing element in the Far East, is no doubt true, although it will not be regarded by impartial persons as a justification for Japanese invasion of Chinese territory. China is helpless, due largely to the lack of national unity'. And the lack of national unity is due to many causes—direct and indirect foreign domination, the vastness of her territory, the inadequacy of the means of communication being a few of them. Add to them Communist risings and the activities of war-lords and bandits and you have a picture of China. Japan suffered only less than China as a result of this anarchy. A very large percentage of Japan's foreign trade was with China. The disturbed condition of that country was a serious hindrance for Japan. The attacks of Chinese nationalism against foreigners in general and against the Japanese in particular became more

1. *Lytton Report*, p. 18ff.

vigorous as time advanced. Boycott was the chief weapon employed by the Chinese. When China succeeded in negotiating treaties with foreign powers which restored to her full control over her tariff policy and which relinquished extraterritorial rights within the Republic, Japan became the principal object of attack. The World Economic Depression brought the situation to a head. Finally Japan decided to embark on a policy of strong action.

But why did Japan, to begin with, select Manchuria for conquest? This was due to many reasons. Manchuria is very near Japan and is adjacent to the Japanese possession of Korea. It is large and very fertile. It is rich in mineral resources and the desired raw materials,—coal, iron, ore, cotton and the staple food, soya beans. The coal reserves of Manchuria have been estimated at, 2,700,000,000 metric tons. Cotton growing may be developed to the extent of

making Japan wholly independent of other countries in this respect. The territory also offers huge supplies of soya beans—59.3 per cent. of world production. Soya bean is said to be the most important food plant in the world. Apart from its food value it has important industrial uses'. Although the population of Manchuria is considerable, being more than thirty million, yet it does not compare favourably with that of Japan or China proper. It has some strategic importance as well, for its effective possession may prevent Russia from becoming a naval power at all. Besides, Japan even before the conquest enjoyed exceptional treaty rights in the southern half of Manchuria ever since 1905, when the South Manchurian Railway Company was organized to take over the Russian Railway. All administrative functions in the area were assigned to the Company. It was autho-

1. G. D. Gray in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 341.

rised to impose taxes and to engage in many industrial and commercial activities. As a result of the Twenty-one Demands (1915), Japan obtained many more rights, some of which she had to renounce in 1922 after the Washington Conference. Thus it is clear that Japan occupied an unusual position in Manchuria.

Moreover, there are sentimental reasons for Japan's action. She has lost a large number of her sons on the plains of Manchuria in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Japan naturally likes to own the "cemetery of Japan's Youth"¹. She had in fact conquered Liaontung in 1894, but had to return it owing to international pressure. This is a bitter memory.

Then, Japanese investments in Manchuria have been on a gigantic scale. The enormous amount of over 1½ billion Yen had been sunk in Manchuria,

1. O'Conroy, *The Menace of Japan*.

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

principally in railways, which were threatened because of the Chinese policy to develop their own railways.

The following table shows the extent and spheres of Japanese investments in Manchuria in 1930'.

(in 1,000 Yen)

Railway	425, 216
Ports and harbours	83, 201
Agriculture, mining and Factory	258, 990
Industry	110, 121
Commerce	117, 753
Electricity and Gas	37, 283
Banking	106, 705
Financing and trust	97, 634
Public utilities	302, 269
Others	49, 458

Total... 1588, 630

These are in short the reasons why Japan chose to fall first of all upon Manchuria, in preference to other parts of China.

1. *Japanese Trade and Industry*, p. 630.

In 1931 on the pretext that the Chinese had murdered a Japanese officer and had tried to destroy a section of the Japanese railway in Manchuria, Japan decided to take forcible possession of Manchuria.

In September 1931 came the Sino-Japanese War. It was no doubt a war, even if it was, and still is, referred to as a "dispute." Despite Japan's membership of the League of Nations, and despite the fact that she was a party to many an important international engagement—such as the League Covenant, the Kellogg Pact and the Nine Power Pact—she actually invaded Chinese territory. Public opinion all the world over was indignant. But Japan stuck to her policy.

In spite of the protests of the League and of many important states Japan seized the capital at Mukden and conquered the whole country. The forces of Marshal Chang were driven out and all Chinese authority was overthrown.



Japan and China

Although she amusingly calls it an 'independent state,' Manchuria is now a Japanese possession in every sense of the word. Japan denies to have broken any of her engagements ! She says that the present situation is a result of the exercise of the right of self-determination on the part of Manchurians. Japanese troops have been stationed there to ensure this "right" to the people.

Manchuria is now called Manchukuo. The Chinese boy-Emperor Henry Pu Yi, who had to abdicate in 1912, was first made the Regent and then in 1934 formally crowned as the Emperor of the newly established state. In reality Japan is the master of Manchuria. She is trying to make the best use of its resources. She has already successfully excluded the foreigners from all the important enterprises.

Having consolidated her position in Manchuria Japan turned in 1933 towards Jehol, a province lying in the southwest

of the new protectorate. Japan claimed that Jehol was an integral part of Manchuria. She started preparations for the subjugation of this province. The Kuomintang on their side had unanimously passed a resolution in December 1932 that every effort should be made to resist further Japanese advance.¹ A large Chinese army, consequently, was stationed in the province of Jehol to stop Japanese aggression. Japan took serious objection to the presence of this army which she pretended threatened the security of Manchukuo. An ultimatum was sent in February 1933 demanding the Chinese withdrawal from Jehol, and on its rejection Japanese advance began. Within about two weeks time no Chinese troops were left north of the Great Wall, but the armistice was not concluded till the end of May, when the Chinese army withdrew west of Peking and the Japanese promised to retire north of the Great

1. Epstein. *Annual Register*, 1932. p. 293.

Wall. The territory evacuated by the Japanese was to become "demilitarized," and was to be policed by the Chinese. Jehol was now included in Manchukuo, and this gave Manchukuo a "natural" frontier. But even the possession of this province did not satisfy Japan. She began her penetration of Inner Mongolia on the one hand and China proper, south of the Great Wall, on the other.

In the summer of 1935 there were those inevitable incidents which have so often compelled states to extend their possessions reluctantly. Skirmishes took place along the Western and Southern frontiers of Jehol between Japanese and Chinese troops. Tokyo protested vigorously and made certain demands, such as the removal of the Chinese general in Chahar (Inner Mongolia), and of many officials in Hopei (a province of China south of the Great Wall). It was also demanded that Chinese troops should be withdrawn from

both these provinces. China had no other option but to comply with these demands. Thus were placed two more provinces under the tutelage of Japan. Technically they remained under Chinese sovereignty. Japan, however, knows only too well the art of reconciling her own effective control with the theoretical sovereignty of others.

Japan's aspirations were not satisfied even by the control of these two additional provinces, and she made a definite attempt to extend her influence to Shensi, Shansi and Shantung. The declared aim of Japan in penetrating south of the Great Wall is to "preserve the peace" in Eastern Asia.

A word about the importance of these North Chinese provinces will not be out of place. Chahar's strategic importance is very great. Japan can now effectively check any Russian movement towards Manchukuo and prevent the extension of communist

influence in China. Japan can interrupt communication between Russia and China through her control of the ancient caravan route which connects North China with Siberia and passes through the Gobi Desert. Similarly by her control of the railway line which connects Peiping with Suiyuan she can interrupt communication between North China and Inner Mongolia. Hopei, Shensi, Shansi, and Shantung are from purely economic point of view very attractive regions. Hopei contains two most important cities of North China, namely Peiping and Tientsin.

The moment chosen by Japan for the invasion of Manchuria was very suitable from the Japanese stand-point. Not only was China weak and divided, which she had been even before 1931, but the Powers interested in China were busy at this time in conquering their own internal troubles. Great Britain's whole economic system was in danger of

collapse. The pound sterling was tottering and the gold standard had to be abandoned. Even the U. S. A. were now feeling the unhappy effects of the World Economic Depression. They were experiencing a depression which they had never known, and which they thought they would never have to experience. Russia was busy with her First Five Year Plan and a war was the last thing the Bolsheviks desired. Japan had been systematically preparing for the invasion of Manchuria and in 1931 the interested powers thought it wise not to challenge Japan in that part of the world where she held an advantageous position. Japan was not likely to let this opportunity go.

Although the Japanese aggression did not result in war between Japan and the interested powers, yet it had important diplomatic repercussions.

We notice changes specially in Soviet and American policies. Russia received

a severe blow in the Far East as a result of Japanese action. For it meant much more than the end of Russian influence in China and Manchuria and a threat to her *de facto* sovereignty of Outer Mongolia. There is reason to believe that Japan would not hesitate to occupy even purely Russian territories in the Extreme East should opportunity present itself. Russia may be prepared to recognise Japanese claims in Manchuria, as is evident by her sale to Japan of her share in the Chinese Eastern Railway for less than £10,000,000, and perhaps even in Inner Mongolia, but she would certainly not tolerate any encroachment upon Russian territory. Such a step will undoubtedly result in war between the two countries.

That Japan is preparing for such a war, and that she expects a conflict in Siberia in the not very distant future is evident from the rapid construction of a new railway line in Manchuria, which

was opened in 1934, between Keshang and Sakhalyan. It connects Harbin with the Soviet frontier by a new route. Clearly the line is of great strategic importance. Apart from economic gain—for it opens up a new agricultural region—it connects the new Japanese protectorate with the heart of Siberia by a much shorter route. In case of war with Russia this railway line would enable Japan to transport troops and supplies much more quickly to the Russian frontier. Blagovestchenask is an important Russian military and trade centre and has a railway which runs into the heart of Siberia. The conquest of this town will enable the Japanese army to cut off all Russian communication with Vladivostok by the Trans-Siberian Railway, and will place the Soviet maritime province in the Farthest East at the mercy of the Japanese invading army. Many towns are being rapidly founded on the new line. Penshan has

already become quite important. Japan intends to build a large aerodrome in this town, for the place happens to be within easy striking distance of Soviet Russia.

Ever since its conquest Japan has kept a very large army in Manchukuo. It has been estimated that 130,000 Japanese troops, or one-third of the whole national army, are stationed in the new protectorate. Over and above there are 110,000 Manchukuo soldiers, and 12,000 trained "White-guardists," under Japanese command. One should be a great believer in the innocence of man to think that these forces are meant merely for the maintenance of "domestic peace." Russians are not such optimists.

It is quite understandable that Russia should be alarmed at the Japanese conquest of Manchuria and her probable intentions with regard to Outer Mongolia and Siberia. Russia has to protect 2,000

miles of frontiers from Vanchuli to Vladivostok which directly touch the territory which has now for all practical purposes become a Japanese possession. Besides, this territory projects into the domain of Russia ; and Vladivostok, the only important Russian port in the Pacific, is connected with European Russia by means of the Chinese Eastern Railway which passes through Manchuria. True, the Trans-Siberian Railway also connects it with the West, but apart from the fact that this is a much longer route, as compared with the other, the Trans-Siberian line, too, very closely skirts the Manchurian frontier and therefore cannot be regarded as immune from Japanese invasion.

The Sino-Japanese War affected Soviet policy in two directions. Firstly it necessitated a military preparation on the part of Russia for a final settlement with Japan. Secondly there came a remarkable change in Russia's

relations with many countries of the world including the U. S. A.

The Far Eastern crisis brought Russia and the U. S. A. nearer each other. The U. S. A. was the only Great Power which had consistently refused to recognise the Government of the U. S. S. R. It was regarded as very unlikely that Soviet Russia and the United States, the most prominent representatives of such antagonistic political and economic systems as Communism and Capitalism, would ever come to an understanding with each other. Post-War American Presidents, Wilson, Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, all had been opposed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U. S. S. R. America refused to recognise the Soviet Government on cultural and religious grounds, which still carry some weight in America. But in the year 1933 the world was not even surprised to find the new President of the U. S. A. taking the initiative in inviting Russia to send

over a representative in order to "explore personally all questions outstanding between the two countries." Litvinoff, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, went to America. Negotiations continued for a few days. The result of these negotiations was that the Soviet Government was recognised by the U. S. A. in November, 1933. President Roosevelt declared that he wished to establish "not merely normal but friendly relations" with the U. S. S. R.'

The American and other apologists of Roosevelt's policy would have us believe that economic considerations were responsible for this reversal of American policy. But an examination of the economic conditions of both these countries would make it clear that economics had very little, if at all, to do with this *rapprochement*. America cannot import anything from Russia, for

1. Details may be studied in the *Survey of International Affairs* for 1933.

practically all that Russia is in a position to export to America is found in abundance in the U. S. A. If that be true, then in these days when the world has reverted to the barter system in international trade, Russia cannot afford to buy from America either, even if she requires certain goods produced in that country. Besides, had this change in policy been really due to economic considerations the recognition of Russia ought to have come long before 1933. It was not economics, it was politics that determined the policy of the U. S. A. There was now a new and very disturbing development in the relations between China and Japan. America could not keep quiet over a development which would in the end mean a powerful blow to her own opportunities in China and which would most certainly increase the power and prestige of her rival in the Pacific. America could now well visualise Japan installed at Vladivostok,

controlling the Pacific Ocean. It was not a very happy prospect for America. A Russo-American alliance, it was thought, would prove capable of checking the advance of Japan in China, just as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had previously stopped Russian penetration of the Far East. This seems to be the only reasonable explanation of the change in America's attitude towards Russia. The Japanese Foreign Office described this move in its inimitable style as "intensely interesting!"

Another result of the Sino-Japanese conflict was a temporary change for the better in the relations between China and Russia. At the end of 1927, due to the energetic action taken by Chiang Kai-Shek, Russian influence in China had disappeared altogether. During the four years that followed there was no improvement in these relations. In fact they became worse as a result of the controversy over the Chinese Eastern Railway.

THE EXPANSION OF JAPAN

In 1929 there arose a serious trouble over the Railway between Soviet Russia and Chang Hsiao-Liang. Soviet troops had to enter Manchuria in order to compel the Manchurian lord to respect the provisions of the Treaty of 1924, providing for the joint ownership of the Railway. But the Sino-Japanese War resulted in a marked improvement in Russo-Chinese relations. China once more resumed diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia towards the end of 1932. This concession on the Chinese side must naturally be attributed to the Japanese policy in Manchuria. China seemed to realise that the Japanese peril was even more formidable than the Bolshevik. The renewal of the Russo-Chinese friendship came opportunely for both the countries. Japan at the time took the news seriously. An official spokesman regarded it as "most unwelcome." He declared that "the elements most disturbing to the peace of the world have now

joined hands, and Japan stands squarely against these forces."

What Russian diplomacy could not achieve for five years in spite of constant endeavours was achieved due to Japan's aggressive policy. Not only were diplomatic relations restored between China and Russia, but the two countries remained on very friendly terms for some time.

Shortly after the Sino-Japanese conflict, Russia took up seriously the task of building a system of alliances in Europe, and settling many of the outstanding questions between herself and her European neighbours. The establishment of the Nazi régime in Germany considerably contributed towards the success that Russia achieved in this difficult task. But Russia has not wholly depended on diplomatic understandings. Her military preparations in the Far East have advanced with a thoroughness typical of Bolshevist Russia.

Since the Far Eastern trouble started the Soviet authorities have been trying to improve communications between Western Russia and the Far East. They have also been trying to make their Far Eastern army as self-supporting as possible. A double-track railway communication has already been established between Samara and Karymskaya. The Trans-Siberian line has been repaired and a more efficient system of signalling has been instituted. A second track has also been laid on the Trans-Baikal-Amur-Ussari line. The Soviet Great Northern Railway, which runs from Moscow to North Vladivostok, was completed in November, 1936. It is described as the most important military railway in the world. The line runs parallel to the Trans-Siberian Railway, but is deep in the Soviet territory and therefore it will be easier to defend against Japan.

Moreover, Siberia and the Far Eastern possessions of Russia are being systema-

tically colonized. They are being freed of "undesirable" elements. Settlers are being imported from Western Russia. As a result of the extraordinary privileges that are granted to them. Many Russians find it more convenient to settle there. Agriculture is receiving the attention that is its due. New industries are being established. The Soviet authorities believe, not without reason, that in the event of war it will be possible to support the Far Eastern army by the supplies from Siberia and the Far East.

The total strength of the Far Eastern army is estimated at 150,000 men. Special attention is being bestowed on the construction of aeroplane bases. Irkutsk is an important example. Several hundred aeroplanes are kept there, out of which many are said to be heavy bombers. Chemical works have been started at Kameronovo to produce poison-gas and other war-

chemicals. All these measures clearly show that Russia, like Japan, is preparing for the struggle that is considered inevitable.

One very important result of the Sino-Japanese War was that for the first time it showed the utter helplessness of the League of Nations to stop aggression when a Great Power was involved in it.¹

Immediately after the Japanese advance in Manchuria, China appealed to the Council of the League of Nations to take cognizance of the situation. Both China and Japan were members of the League, and therefore the articles of the Covenant were unquestionably applicable to this case. But the tangible results of China's several appeals were, firstly, the

1. All the important documents connected with the Sino-Japanese War with special reference to the League of Nations have been collected and systematically arranged by Wheeler-Bennett in the *Documents on International Affairs* (1932).

adoption by the Council and the Assembly of resolutions asking both the parties to respect each other's rights and to avoid any aggravation of the situation, secondly the appointment of a Commission of enquiry under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton, a former Governor of Bengal, and of a Committee of Nineteen to deal with the situation.

The report of the Commission was presented in October, 1932. It condemned the action of Japan. It described Manchukuo as a puppet state and its government as unsupported by the majority of the people. It recognized the special position of Japan in Manchukuo but did not consider it as a justification for the invasion. It recommended the withdrawal of Japan from Manchuria and the conclusion of treaties of commerce and friendship and mutual security between Japan and China. It also recommended the end of the Chinese boycott of foreign

goods. On the recommendation of the Committee of Nineteen the Report was adopted by the Assembly in February 1933, by 42 votes to 1, the adverse vote being that of Japan.

Japan contested the arguments of Lord Lytton and his colleagues and refused to be bound by their findings. Japan proclaimed that throughout she had been acting in self-defence, and therefore her action should not be regarded as a breach of the Kellogg Pact. She asserted that her action was not in contravention of the Nine Power Pact, because she had not impaired the integrity or independence of China! All that had happened was: the Manchurians had exercised the right of self-determination. Japan had recognized this right, and she was determined to see that the people of Manchuria were not deprived of it. As regards the Covenant she pointed out that China was not a state and therefore Articles 10, 11 and 15

were not applicable to this case. Instead of retiring from Manchukuo, as the Commission had suggested, Japan retired from the League of Nations !

This open defiance of the League went wholly unpunished. The Covenant has provided that in these circumstances it is the duty of the member states to come to the rescue of the aggrieved party and to adopt measures of coercion against the aggressor. But even economic coercion was not resorted to. Article 16 which makes it incumbent on member states to sever all trade or financial relations with the guilty state and to have no dealings whatever with it was never applied to Japan.

The League had succeeded in preventing or bringing to an early end many minor wars during its short period of existence. In 1931 there came the real test and the League failed miserably. Since the end of the World War nations had been trying to devise peaceful

methods of settling international disputes. Many people believed that in the League of Nations the world had at last found an institution which should prove to be an effective check to war. The Far Eastern crisis showed that it was yet a dream. The League of Nations failed, not only because there was something wrong in its constitution, but because the members of the League, particularly the Great Powers were not willing to coerce Japan. Great Britain was not prepared to take prompt action without the U. S. A. The U. S. A. protested against Japan's action and evolved what has been called 'the Stimson Doctrine', but were not prepared to take the lead and adopt an active policy, backed by force of arms. The only consolation for China was that the League of Nations had refused to give legal recognition to Manchukuo !

It is difficult to prophesy what course the Japanese policy is going to take after the establishment of Japan's position

in Manchuria and Jehol. As pointed out, new complications have already arisen in North China. The new Agreement with Germany (concluded in November, 1936), and a general understanding with Italy have further strengthened the position of Japan. It seems to be, however, probable that so far as direct conquest of new territories is concerned we are not going to hear of it in the near future. But that does not mean that Japan will abstain from extending her indirect control.

Japan's aim will now be to consolidate what has been won. She has already got the control of those sources of supply of minerals and raw materials which she requires for the expansion of her industries. She will now have iron and coal and cotton in plenty. Japan by her conquest of Manchuria and Jehol has brought under her jurisdiction an area which is about the size of Germany and France and Belgium and

Holland combined. In order to develop the resources of this vast area Japan would require many a decade. The possibilities of developing Manchuria are immense. It is true that Japan would be in need of more markets, and China proper is an excellent market. But for the expansion of trade the good will of the country concerned is a necessary condition. Besides, the direct government of the whole of China is bound to be a source of weakness rather than of strength to Japan. Perhaps the interested powers will now also be in a better position to offer resistance to any scheme of further Japanese expansion. On the side of China there are indications that she may after all forget and forgive the conquest of Manchuria and come to an understanding with her powerful neighbour. She must have by this time recognized the futility of appeals to the League of Nations. She has perhaps begun to realise the advantages of Japanese

friendship faced as she is with internal disorders and communist upheavals.

The three points of Mr. Hirota announced towards the end of 1935 seem to embody the present and future Japanese programme *vis-a-vis* China : (1) China must abandon her policy of playing one foreign country against the other and give positive demonstrations affecting all phases of Chinese life, of a "sincere" desire to co-operate with Japan ; (2) China must recognize the existence of Manchukuo ; (3) China and Japan must form "a common front against the Chinese communists and the further extension of Red influence in China."

Japan will try not only to prevent Russia but other nations as well from meddling in Chinese affairs. Japan has already made several important announcements in this connection. An announcement was made in April 1934 by that mysterious person, "the

1. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 14 ; no. 4.

official spokesman" of the Japanese Foreign Office, in which it was said that Japan considered herself responsible along with China for the preservation of peace and maintenance of orderly government in East Asia and that she was not prepared to tolerate any foreign activities in China which in the opinion of the Japanese Government were inimical to Japan.'

The problem for Japan will now be to extend her influence over China without, however, taking over the impossible task of governing a whole continent. Japan will encourage those movements in China which aim at friendly relations between the two yellow peoples. It is likely that she will gradually establish a new "Monroe Doctrine" for the Far East, which is different from direct control. But for the achievement of this purpose

1. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 13 ; no. 1. The announcement which caused great misgivings in the Foreign Offices of many important countries, was followed by similar statements by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, Geneva and London.

diplomacy will perhaps prove to be a more effective weapon than aggressive military action. We may hear of occasional threats and minor coercive measures accompanying Japanese diplomatic activity but very probably we shall not hear of any more serious attempts on the part of Japan to conquer other Chinese territories for the purpose of direct government. We are certainly going to hear of the "Hands off China" policy and the "Pan-Asiatic Doctrine," but there is every reason to believe that Japan will not be the first to throw down the glove.¹ Not infrequently, however, it is the unexpected that happens in history, and therefore it is unwise to be dogmatic.

1. Mogi and Redman, *The Problem of the Far East*, p. 329ff.

CHAPTER II
THE EXPANSION OF ITALY

As in the case of Japan, let us begin with the economic condition of Italy, for she, too, is demanding a place in the sun primarily for economic reasons. Three economic grounds are given for the acquisition of colonies by Italy. Firstly, it is claimed that there is what has been called "population pressure" in Italy; secondly, that Italy suffers from a shortage of essential raw materials and fuels; and, thirdly, that Italy is dependent upon imported food-stuffs for domestic consumption.

Italians, as is well known, are a growing nation, and they are growing rapidly. They have more than doubled themselves during the last hundred years. In 1816 the population of Italy was estimated at 18 million; and shortly after the Unification they numbered 26 million. Since then the number has

increased enormously as the following table demonstrates :¹

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>
1872	26,801,154	1926	39,349,000
1882	28,459,628	1930	40,759,000
1901	32,475,253	1933	41,806,000
1911	34,671,377	1934	42,217,000
1921	38,033,000	1935	42,621,000

At present the population of Italy amounts to about 44 million souls ; and it is increasing at the rate of about 400,000 a year. The continuous increase in the population of Italy, outstripping, as it does, the economic capacity of the country, has produced a dangerous situation.

It is, however, strange that a country which claims colonies because of "population pressure" is doing all that lies in its power to aggravate this evil. In many of his speeches and writings Mussolini has expounded his views on

1. *Statesman's Year Book.*

this question. In the Chamber, in 1927, he said :

“Italy needs 60 million inhabitants. Some unintelligent people may say there are too many of us. The intelligent will reply : there are too few of us. I claim that the numbers of a nation condition its political, and consequently its economic and moral power. To count for something Italy must emerge with a population of not less than 60 million inhabitants at the threshold of the second half of this century.”

In an article, published in the *Gerarchia*, in September 1928, Mussolini again expounded his theory of population in these words : ‘

“The thesis that quantity may be replaced by quality is false ; false and stupid is the thesis that a lesser population signifies higher prosperity... Sixty million Italians will make the

1. Quoted by ‘Elwin’ *Fascism at Work*, p. 164.

weight of their numbers and their force felt in the history of the world."

The Fascist state has adopted a definite policy of stimulating the birth rate and increasing the population as rapidly as possible. Festivals of marriages and fecundity are celebrated in which the Duce himself participates, personally. Railway fare is reduced for honeymoon couples. Prizes are awarded to parents of a large number of children. Taxation is adjusted according to the size of the family. Many of the taxes decrease as the number of children increases. Parents of ten living sons do not pay any taxes. Childless spouses have to pay a higher inheritance tax than spouses with one child, and those with at least two children are completely exempt from inheritance taxes. Cheap homes are allotted by the local authorities in order of preference according to the size of the family. Some municipalities grant reductions for

gas, electricity, etc. Medals and diplomas and sometimes even premiums are offered for prolificacy. Municipalities organise productivity competitions and award prizes to the families which produce most babies within a given number of years. The Fascist government maintains a regular department for the protection of maternity and childhood, known as the *Opera Nazionale della Maternita e dell' Infanzia*. Abortion is prohibited and severe punishment imposed on those who violate the law.

Birth control is forbidden and the propaganda in its favour is put under heavy penalty by the new Fascist Penal Code. Here the Catholic church, too, comes to the assistance of the Fascist state, and declares that birth control is a sin, and procreation an "act of God."

Marriages are being encouraged and bachelors are discriminated against in many ways. Between the ages of 25 and 65 heavy taxes are imposed upon

them. In April 1934, the income tax on bachelors, which was already very high, was raised from 25 to 50 per cent of their incomes. In the Government Services they are clearly at a disadvantage. Appointments and promotions depend, to a large extent, upon the marital status of the individual. In November, 1933, the Duce issued an order that all bachelors who held offices in the party or wished to be nominated as candidates in the parliamentary election, must marry, otherwise they would lose their offices or not be nominated as candidates.

Obviously, the population policy of Fascist Italy is based on military and political considerations and is quite in keeping with the imperialist tendencies of new Italy. The same considerations determine Fascist attitude towards emigration.

Before the War a large number of Italians used to emigrate every year to

other countries, principally to America and Argentine. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the average annual emigration rose to over 200,000, and during the first fourteen years of the present century, it reached the enormous figure of 600,000. But during the post-war period, largely due to the Immigration policy of nearly all countries which formerly admitted Italian emigrants, the number dwindled, considerably. Then Italians began to emigrate, in fairly large number, to France and her African colonies. The French became alarmed at the growing immigration of Italians in South France. France did not seem willing to have any more Italians. She did not like to create an unemployment problem on a gigantic scale, from which unlike other countries she had not yet suffered.

Apart from this consideration, the Italians, who under the Fascist regime emigrated to France or her colonies, were

staunch nationalists ; they were not prepared to merge themselves into the French nation and forget their own nationality, of which they were so proud. France, in accordance with her traditional policy, would either turn them into Frenchmen or would not have them at all. The question of the nationality of Italians in France and in French colonies, specially in Tunis, where Italians, by the way, formed the majority of the population, was one of the most important causes of post-War Franco-Italian tension. According to French law the third generation of all immigrants was to be legally regarded as French. The Fascist government insisted that Italian nationality was inalienable and permanent, wheresoever an Italian might have his domicile. The result of French legislation was that Italian emigration to France and her colonies very nearly came to an end. Only in 1935, France made a concession in this respect, when

it was provided in the Rome Pact that in Tunis, all children, born of Italian parents up to 1965, would retain their nationality.

The Fascists themselves do not consider emigration as a very happy solution of their population problem, for in this way Italy is deprived of her best soldiers and labourers, those who emigrate being young and hardy people. Although Mussolini had once recognized emigration as 'a physiological necessity for the Italian people,'¹ after a few years of Fascist rule the traditional policy was reversed and the Government began to discourage emigration, even while there were still possibilities in this direction. Motives of prestige and military strength were responsible for it. Man-power must be conserved at all costs. Mussolini is very particular in retaining the sons of Italy, for according to him, "Italy must appear on the threshold of the

1. Mussolini in a speech at Milan on April 2, 1923.

second half of the century with a population of not less than 60,000,000 inhabitants. If we fail...we shall not found an empire, we shall be degraded to a colony."

Signor Grandi explained the Fascist attitude towards emigration, in 'a speech in the Chamber on December 31, 1927 :

"We, as Fascists, must have the courage to say that emigration is an evil so long as it is, as at present, directed towards countries of foreign sovereignty. Emigration is necessary, but it should be emigration to Italian countries and possessions only."

But the Italian possessions mostly consisted of deserts and barren mountains. No wonder the Italian emigrants did not like the idea of exchanging France or America for their own colonies.

Fascism has not been content to restrict emigration by means of propaganda and legislation ; it has even

1. Quoted by 'Elwin' in *Fascism at Work*, p. 161.

induced Italians living in foreign countries to return home. Drastic reductions are granted in steamship and railway fares for repatriation.

On the basis of what has been stated above, it becomes difficult to say whether Italian imperialism is a result of 'population pressure', or 'population pressure' an outcome of the imperialist policy of Fascist Italy.

Shortage of raw materials and fuel is given as another justification for the aggressive colonial policy of Italy. Italy is very poor in raw materials and basic minerals. She has to import large quantities of coal, iron, steel, mineral oils, wood and cotton. During the five years, 1931 to 1935, her annual imports of raw materials and minerals averaged about 6,000,000,000 lire. Because of her poverty in this respect, she could not develop her industries as the Fascists would wish. The colonies of Italy were not capable of supplying Italy with

the raw materials which she required. In the markets of the world, therefore, Italy stood at a considerable disadvantage as compared with other great industrial nations.

Italy is very largely dependent upon import of foodstuffs, which annually amount to over 2,000,000,000 lire. The Fascist government has done all that is possible "to free the Italian people from the slavery of foreign bread." It has carried on, specially since 1925, a regular campaign for making Italy self-supporting in respect of cereals. The '*Battaglia del grano*' has achieved some success, but there are limits to artificial encouragement by means of such 'battles'. The production of wheat has increased no doubt, but it has not kept pace with the increase in population, and Italy still imports about 20,000,000 quintals of wheat every year.

The result of over-population and general poverty of the country is that

THE EXPANSION OF ITALY

the people's standard of living is low. Average income in Italy is lower than in any of the principal countries of the West and impartial observers are of opinion that, comparatively speaking, Italians are very poorly fed and ill-clothed.

Italian colonies could not solve this problem, for reasons not far to seek.

Italy, before the conquest of Abyssinia, had four colonial possessions, *viz.* Tripoli, Cirenaica, (both united into Libya), Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, apart from Aegean Islands which are fourteen in number and of which the Rhodes Island is the biggest with an area of 542 sq. miles. The Italian colonies "were largely sand." Although their area was considerable, their population was very small and their natural resources extremely meagre. The following facts and figures will help us in understanding

1. Mussolini's expression.

the true nature of the Italian colonial Empire.

Area and Population of the Italian Colonies¹.

<i>Colony</i>	<i>Area in Sq. miles.</i>	<i>Population (1931)</i>	
		<i>Total</i>	<i>Italian</i>
Libya	632,500	707,663	29,749
Eritrea	45,754	621,621	4,565
Somaliland	194,000	1,010,815	1,630
Total...	872,254	2,340,099	35,944 ²

The Italian colonies could not absorb a large number of Italians because they were unfit for colonization. Not even one-half per cent of the Italian people could make these colonies their home. In fact, the Italians in New York alone numbered twenty-five times as many as those in all the Italian colonies put together.

1. Based on the *Statesman's Year Book* (1935).

2. At present the number of Italians in the colonies is estimated at 40,000 out of 10,000,000 Italians living abroad.

Trade between the mother country and the colonies has been negligible when compared with the colonial trade of other nations ; and even of this small trade Italian imports from her colonies have been three times as large as exports. How could it be otherwise. The colonies are of little economic value, because they are mostly barren. They cannot supply the raw materials which the mother country needs most ; and for purposes of trade they are valueless because they are so poor and thinly populated.

No wonder the Italian Empire has been a heavy burden upon the national budget. In recent years, Italy has spent on average about 600 million lire annually on the colonies. For a country which has been considered for a long time as deficient in capital this is a huge sum. Italy has indulged in this kind of uneconomic imperialism for the sake of prestige, which in its turn, has led to more and more indebtedness, until the

national debt reached the enormous figure of over 100,000,000,000 lire in 1935, the cost of the Abyssinian expedition apart.

Italy was over-populated, short of raw materials and foodstuffs ; and the Italian colonies, (before the conquest of Abyssinia), instead of being of help to Italy in these respects, were a constant burden on her finances. What was to be done in these circumstances ? Mussolini gave a simple and straight answer to the question. The problem was to be solved by means of a revision of the peace treaties and by reallotment of colonies and mandates.

Speaking of the pressing need for more colonies Mussolini once said :

“These two colonies (he meant the Italian possessions in Africa) cannot solve our population problem... We missed that legitimate satisfaction which should have come to us from right and from duty fulfilled during and after the War.

Colonial development would have been for us not merely a logical consequence of our population problem, but would have constituted a formula for the solution of our economic situation. Even now, at a distance of ten years from the War, this 'situation has to find its solution."

Italy could not understand why France with an almost steady population should have such vast overseas possessions in the form of colonies and mandates, specially when these areas happened to be so very near Italy. It seemed very unjust to Italians that Tunis, where Italians formed a majority of the population, should be a French and not an Italian possession, in spite of its nearness to Italy and in spite of her imperative need for colonies.

Italy's desire for colonies is not a new one. Ever since Italy has been united, she has dreamt of founding an Empire.

Italian unity was accomplished in 1870, under the House of Savoy. A few districts, however, still remained under foreign rule. Ever since the fall of the Roman Empire Italy had been a political nonentity and in the phrase of Metternich, nothing more than a geographical expression. Once, however, Italy had almost completely freed herself from foreign domination, for which she had to struggle hard for several generations, she herself became an imperialist nation. She demanded a place in the sun and did not hesitate in adopting a policy which meant depriving other peoples of their freedom. But she could not wholly concentrate her attention on the acquisition of colonies, as Italian patriotism could not be indifferent to the recovery of *Italia Irredenta*.

Thus, after the unification, Italian policy was directed towards the achievement of two main objectives : recovery of *Italia Irredenta* and the creation of a

colonial Empire. The first objective could be achieved at the expense of Austria-Hungary, the second at the expense principally of France. Consequently the foreign policy of Italy from 1870 to 1914 was a policy of indecision. She was wavering all the time. Shortly after France occupied Tunis in 1881, Italy joined the Austro-German Alliance. But when France seemed to be willing to recognize Italian claims in Tripoli, her relations with the Germanic Empires became somewhat cool, and for some years before the World War Italy seemed to be inclining towards the *Entente*. Germany recognized, as Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that "Italian flirtations with the *Entente* had led to dangerous intimacies."

Throughout the period from 1871 to 1914 Italy was restless. She was haunted by the memory that she was once the seat of a great empire. In order to be worthy of her heritage,

she must carve off for herself an empire in Africa.

When Italy seriously took up the task of acquiring a colonial empire, the world had already been divided among some of the fortunate countries, not necessarily Great Powers. Most of the backward countries of the world had come under the direct or indirect control of one of the advanced nations. Thus Italy, like Germany, was seriously handicapped in her struggle for colonies. Whereas in the middle of the nineteenth century Africa was still largely unoccupied and even unexplored, by the time the Italians came in the field, all the attractive territories in Africa had been conquered and were being 'civilized' by the 'senior' Powers that had stolen a march over countries which were still striving for unity.

The hopes of the Italian imperialists were dashed when France occupied Tunis in 1881. Italian expansion in

North Africa was thus nipped in the bud. The Italians had thought that the geographical situation of Tunis made it a natural starting point for an Italian Empire, since Tunis was less than 100 miles from Sicily, and already contained a large Italian population. Then in 1882 Great Britain occupied Egypt, and the Italians felt that they had been robbed of their 'natural' field for expansion. A war with France and Great Britain, or one of them, was out of the question. All that Italy could do was to look round for other openings.

Italy, turned towards the barren littoral of the Red Sea. With small beginnings Italy aspired after establishing an empire in East Africa which should include Abyssinia', a country that was still independent. If Italy could get a

1. Abyssinia is a mutilated form of the name given to the country by the Arabs, originally meaning 'confusion' or 'mixed race.' The official name of the country is Ethiopia.

foothold on the coasts, she hoped to penetrate gradually into the Abyssinian hinterland.

Although it was as far back as 1870 that Rubattino, an Italian shipowner, purchased Assab on the Red Sea coast, from a local chieftain, where he intended to establish a coaling station for his ships, it was only in the eighties of the last century that the town was actually occupied by the Italian Government. Having established themselves in Assab, they proceeded to occupy a strip of territory, several hundred miles long, but of little economic value. To this territory which lay between the arid shores of the Red Sea and the mountains of Abyssinia, the name of Eritrea was given, which is of classical origin, being derived from the *Mare Erythraeum* of the Romans.

Simultaneously while Italy was acquiring Eritrea, she was extending her domain farther south.

In 1889 Crispi, the Italian Prime Minister, laid claim to the long Somali coast, stretching for more than a thousand miles, because he had discovered that the local chieftains had an "ardent desire" for having Italy as their protector. That at least a part of this littoral belonged to Zanzibar mattered little, as Italy had come to an agreement with Great Britain, the protector of Zanzibar. As a result of the Convention of 1892 Italy leased the Benadir Coast for an annual rent of 160,000 rupees. The government of this territory was first entrusted to a company, which had the privilege of exploiting the newly acquired lands, but in 1905 the Company, having incurred immense losses, which could not be made up by government subsidies, transferred its holdings to the Italian Government.

The acquisition of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland was made possible because of encouragement by Great Britain, which

was afraid of the designs of France in Africa'. The French, having lost Egypt, were after the conquest of Soudan and the extension of their influence in Abyssinia. Italy was used by Great Britain as a pawn in the international game.

Italy was also encouraged in every way in her ambitions with regard to Abyssinia. Italy could not long remain satisfied with both the poverty-stricken colonies, which were not self-supporting even with regard to their administrative expenses. Abyssinia was a primitive country, and was supposed to be weak and unable to fight a European nation. In the eighties of the last century she had been further weakened by civil strife and war against the Soudanese *dervishes*, in which Negus John lost his life, at Gallabat, in March, 1889.

At this stage the Italian intervention in Abyssinia began. Italy came forward

1. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, p. 144.

to help Menelik, one of the local chieftains, who was trying to usurp the imperial throne, and in return for her assistance, she secured by the Treaty of Ucciali (1889), an extension of Eritrea into the Abyssinian highlands. Even more important, however, was Article 17 of this Treaty which read : "His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia *shall be at liberty to* avail himself of the government of His Majesty the King of Italy for the treatment of all questions concerning other powers and governments." This was in the Amharic text. The Italian version was different. In place of the phrase '*shall be at liberty to*' was employed the word '*consents*', which changed the whole meaning of the article and converted Abyssinia into an Italian protectorate.

Italy thought that the Treaty of Ucciali gave her the entire control over the foreign policy of Abyssinia. The Negus would not accept the Italian

version. The independence of Abyssinia now became the real issue.

The inevitable clash came in 1895. Menelik, the Negus, had a united people behind him, and had received in previous years, invaluable help in the form of artillery and firearms, from France, which for obvious reasons, was jealous of Italian expansion.

It is not necessary to go into the details of the Italo-Abyssinian War of 1895-96. One fact emerges clearly from what happened: The Italy of Crispi did not appreciate the dangers and difficulties of an invasion of Abyssinia. The Italian Premier took it for granted that civilisation must triumph over barbarism. Italy had no experience of colonial warfare on a large scale. No wonder she was caught in the very trap which she had prepared.

The battle of Adowa (March 1, 1896), which resulted in the annihilation of the pick of the Italian army, was the first

of its kind. Never before in colonial history had a European nation suffered a defeat so drastic and complete at the hands of the 'natives', as the defeat of the Italians at Adowa. The Italians lost many of their principal officers and ten thousand men. Italy had to recognize the independence of Abyssinia as a result of the treaty with which the war came to a close. Italian imperialism received a severe blow at Adowa, from which it could not recover for a long time.

The only other serious attempt made by Italy before 1935 to acquire colonies was in 1911, when after thorough preparation, military and diplomatic, she acquired the two Turkish provinces, lying east of Tunis, as a result of the Turco-Italian War. It was in September, 1911, that Italy sent a strange ultimatum to Turkey declaring that the state of disorder and neglect in which Tripoli and Cyrenaica are left by Turkey must

come to an end, as this was for Italy "a vital interest of the very first order." The war that ensued in spite of Turkey's acceptance of all concessions short of territorial cession, resulted in the conquest of Tripoli and Cyrenaica to which the old Roman name of Libya was later given by the Italians. Italy thus acquired a colony which was large in size, but which, instead of bringing profits remains to this day, in spite of all possible effort, a costly imperial luxury.

This was, in short, the position of Italy in the colonial sphere, when the world War came in August 1914. Italy at this time was a member of the Triple Alliance, but she did not consider herself bound to come to the help of the Central Powers. Instead she declared her neutrality, and she actually remained neutral until May, 1915.

Italy had her own grievances against Austria and France, and she wanted to

make use of this favourable opportunity. She knew that both the parties were eager for her support. Salandra, the Italian Premier, was determined to wrest the utmost advantage from this position. "Free from all pre-occupations, prejudice and sentiment," he said, "we must have no other thought than exclusive and unlimited devotion to our country, to *Sacro egoismo* for Italy."

During this period of neutrality the Central Powers as well as the Allies tried their best, by means of lavish promises to purchase Italian support. They bid higher and higher for Italian favour. In the bargain the principal Allied Powers, namely France, Great Britain and Russia, promised more than the Germanic Empires. They could well afford to be generous at the expense of others. Italy accepted their offer. The bargain was made in London.

According to the Secret Pact of London (26th April, 1915) the principal

Allied Powers made large but very definite promises to Italy. They swallowed their scruples and promised to Italy all territory lying south of the Brennero Pass. This was clearly in violation of the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. It was, however, granted to Italy, for it would give her a strategic frontier in the north. Trieste, Istrian Peninsula, the northern portion of Dalmatia, certain islands in the Adriatic and Valona (a port of great importance in Albania, just opposite the heel of the Italian "boot"), all were to be handed over to Italy, in the event of victory. These gains would have undoubtedly made her supreme in the Adriatic. But the gain of Italy would have meant not only the loss of Austria-Hungary, but also of one of the Allies, namely Serbia, for whose sake the war had primarily begun. Besides these territorial gains in Europe, Italy was entitled to

compensation in Africa, if either France or Great Britain increased their possessions in that continent. Italian interest in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean was also recognized with regard to Asia Minor. These promises, if fulfilled, would have meant even more than the achievement of both the main objectives of Italian foreign policy—the recovery of *Italia Irredenta* and the creation of a colonial empire.

It was only after these definite promises were made to Italy that she declared war against the Central Powers. Whatever Mr. Lloyd George may now say in his *War Memoirs*, Italian support was certainly of some value to the Allies. We may well imagine the difficulties with which France would have been confronted on two sides, had Italy joined the Central Powers.

The Allies emerged victorious from the Great War. Italy had joined the conflict on a clear understanding. At

the Peace Conference of Paris the time had come for the fulfilment of all those promises. But the principal makers of peace—Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George—found that it was impossible for various reason to satisfy Rome.

The outcome of the Peace Conference came as a great disappointment to Italy. Of all the victors she came out of the War as perhaps the most disappointed. It is true that by the Treaty of Saint Germain Italy obtained one of her two important objects, the Brennero frontier. But this did not wholly satisfy Italy so far as her claims in the Adriatic were concerned ; for although her traditional foe, the Habsburg Empire, was no more, another state, which was perhaps capable of doing more harm than the defunct Empire, had come into being. Jugoslavia, because of her situation and because of French influence, which was noticeable from the very beginning, was regarded by Italy as even a greater danger than

the deceased Dual Monarchy. A new balance of power was created to the great disadvantage of Italy. Moreover, what was more important was that apart from minor frontier rectifications, Italy's claims with regard to the German colonial empire and the Turkish possessions were totally ignored. In the words of Mussolini, "when they came round the conference table of that mean peace treaty, we got only the crumbs of that rich colonial dinner."

Fascists are bitter over the outcome of the Peace Conference. They blame Great Britain and France, particularly the latter country for the unfavourable peace terms. True, Wilson was also opposed to Italian claims. But, so the Fascists argue, America was not a party to the Pact of London. France, on the other hand, made certain precise promises and then went back upon her word. Hence Italian resentment against France.

The attitude of France during the peace negotiations is also quite understandable. As a result of the Great War she had succeeded in crushing the most formidable of her opponents. Germany was reduced, for the time being at any rate, to a second class Power. French supremacy on the continent was established. She was not prepared to share it, with any other Power, not even with an ex-ally and a Latin sister-nation. Besides, the repeated declarations with regard to the right of peoples to self-determination could not be easily disregarded by the chief representatives of Powers at the Peace Conference. The result was disappointment and bitterness in Italy.

Italy had cut rather a poor figure in the War ; and when the hostilities came to a close, she found herself weak and divided. Her former allies were not impressed by Italy's War contribution and gave her what they thought she

deserved. Italy's military strength was exhausted and her economic system shattered, as a result of the War. Communist disturbances were common and civil war seemed to be coming. She was unable to effect forcibly a redistribution of the colonial world. In this helpless condition all she could do was to protest and wait for the moment when she would be able 'to make her voice heard'.

With Fascism there came a change in the status of Italy. Mussolini gave his country a strong government which it had not known for many a century. Never since the fall of Rome had Italy had a government of this type. Mussolini made a new nation out of the chaotic mass that he found in 1922. He completely modernized Italy, by eliminating many of the evil survivals of mediaeval times. Whereas Italy, before the coming of Mussolini, was called a great power by courtesy, it actually became so only

after about a decade of Fascist rule. With Fascism Italy entered a new era of political importance and economic development. It got rid of all mediaeval survivals and became united as it had never been before. With the attainment of unity and power, Italy began once more to dream of expansion abroad.

In a survey of Fascist imperialism the psychological factor must be regarded as extremely important. It is necessary to explain the mentality of a Fascist, his attitude towards state and his ideas on war and peace. Only then would it be possible to estimate correctly the place of imperialism in Fascist theory.

The Fascist system of government is an autocratic system. It is opposed to Liberalism and Democracy and all they stand for. And the foreign policy of an autocracy—be it an absolute monarchy, be it a dictatorship—is as a rule different from that of a liberal democracy. An autocrat's psychology is very different

from that of a democrat. Their outlook on life differs. They represent not only two types of "political animals," but two types of men. Democracies stand for liberty at home. It is only natural that they should respect the liberty of other peoples. In autocracies, on the other hand, people are deprived of their individual freedom. How can it be expected from such governments that they would respect the independence of other nations? In their foreign relations, therefore, democracies, as a rule, are not inclined towards territorial expansion and consequently they stand for peace and international understanding. Autocracies are inclined towards imperialism, and therefore they are warlike and militarist.

But this does not mean that democracies have never waged wars of conquest and have never thought of building up empires, or autocracies have never served the cause of peace. Such

an assumption will not be in conformity with historical truth. The two greatest imperialist nations of our own time—Great Britain and France—are democracies. What is claimed, however, is not that democracies have never been imperialist and warlike, and autocracies never peaceful; it is only intended to point out the main tendency in each of these systems of government.

The domestic politics of democracies are made up of too many checks and balances, too many discussions and understandings, too many concessions and compromises and therefore in democracies there is a tendency to justify even the aggressive and imperialistic policy through what has been termed a "rational-pacifistic ideology." ¹ It is necessary for a democracy to characterize its every war as a war of defence. This is something which an autocracy, because of its belief in militarism and

1. Kelsen, *Staatsform und Weltanschauung*.

in the heroic method, does not at all require. An autocracy would rather glorify war, and would take pride in subduing other peoples.

Fascist Italy, true to the autocratic type, is intensely nationalist ; it opposes internationalism ; it ridicules pacifism ; it believes in the inevitability and even in the desirability of War. Naturally it cannot be but imperialist. Says Mussolini : "Humanity is still and always has been an abstraction of time and space ; men are still not brothers, do not want to be and evidently cannot be. Peace is hence absurd, or rather it is a pause in war...Man will continue to be, wolf among wolves for a bit of land, for a trickle of water, for a crumb of bread, for a woman's kiss, for a necessity or a caprice..." And again, "Internationalism is an article of luxury, good for the aristocracies of art, banking, industry and snobbish imbecility...at bottom internationalism is an absurd fable."

On the other hand, Mussolini has many good things to say of nationalism, militarism and war. According to him, as has been pointed out, war is not only inevitable, it is desirable. "Struggle," he says, and it is very typical of Mussolini, "is the origin of all things, for life is full of contrasts : there is love and hatred, white and black, day and night, good and evil ; and until these contrasts are reduced to an equilibrium struggle will always remain at the root of human nature, like a supreme fatality. And on the whole it is well that it is so.....the day in which there should be no more strife would be a day of melancholy, of the end of things, of ruin." ¹

Not long ago Mussolini declared in a speech that "Italy was a military, militarist, and warlike nation."² Unfortunately for themselves some of the

1. Mussolini, *Fascism : Political and Social Doctrine*.

2. In a speech at the army manoeuvres, August 24,

1934.

Italian newspapers left out the word 'militarist' while reporting the speech in their columns. Mussolini was furious over this unpardonable omission. In an article in *Popolo d' Italia*, which it was confidently asserted came from the pen of the Duce himself, it was said : "Evidently this is like a glass of castor oil to weak stomachs, but there cannot be any weak stomachs in the ranks of the Fascist party. We say, we repeat, we cry out that Fascist Italy must be militarist. Militarist is the nation that subordinates to military necessities everything else of the material and moral life of the individual as well as of the community."

Mussolini informs the world without the least hesitation that he does not believe that perpetual peace is possible or desirable, and that the fundamental virtues of man are fully revealed only in bloodstained struggles.¹ In the words of

1. Speech in the Chamber of Deputies, May 26, 1934.

another Fascist, "the State displays in war its own strength."¹

These ideas are the natural outcome of the Fascist conception of state and particularly of sovereignty. Although modern writers have recognized that the theory of sovereignty must be thoroughly revised because nations have become so dependent politically and economically upon one another, that the idea of complete independence of each must be considered as wholly inapplicable to the present circumstances, Fascism sticks to the old conception of sovereignty.

"There is no value outside and above the state." "As to its own political interests, be these preservation or expansion, every state is its own judge, unique and without appeal. There is nothing superior to the State." Again, "The two ideas of sovereignty and

1. G. Gentile, quoted by "Elwin", *Fascism at Work*, p. 245.

limitation exclude one another. The state as sovereignty and power is absolute ; it is beyond law." These are the views of several representative Fascist authorities on state and sovereignty.¹ This claim to absolute sovereignty, and denial of the idea of international law must necessarily lead to war. An exalted view of sovereignty and State and the love of war are closely connected with imperialism and aggressive policy abroad.

Mussolini's Italy is imperialist. According to the Duce—and whose word is more authoritative in the authoritarian state? —"Imperialism is the eternal and immutable law of life. At bottom it is but the need, the desire and the will for expansion which every living, healthy individual or people has in itself."

This was, however, written in 1919 when Mussolini had not yet seized the reins of power. But we have many such

1. *ibid*, p. 244 f.

fresh examples. In 1932, for instance, he wrote in an article on the theory of Fascism in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*: "For Fascism the growth of empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential manifestation of vitality and its opposite a sign of decadence. Peoples which are rising or rising after a period of decadence, are always imperialist; any renunciation is a sign of decay and death." In a pamphlet he says: ".....The imperialistic urge is.....an elementary force of our human nature like the will-to-power itself..... In each and every guise it is symptomatic of man's quenchless vitality... No sooner is one born than the "imperialist" within presses his claim... That clamorous force ceases only with death itself." ¹

Luigi Villari, a leading Fascist theorist, considers the expansion of Italy as something inevitable. "Every great country," he writes, "every active people

1. Mussolini, *What kind of Man I am* ?

fountain of world thought, but the capital of a great empire.

The ancient Roman Empire began in Africa. In the third century B.C., as a result of two great Punic wars, Rome became the dominant power in the Mediterranean basin. Mussolini and the Fascists perhaps thought "why should the Second Roman Empire not begin in Africa, with the Abyssinian expedition?"

It is true that on many occasions Mussolini attempted to calm international public opinion by declaring that the Fascists did not aim at subjugating other peoples, and that their imperialism was of a different type, and "was not dangerous for other nations." Other countries, assured Mussolini, need not be afraid of Fascist imperialism, because it was "moral and spiritual." "An empire can be thought of.....as a nation which directly or indirectly guides other nations—without the need of conquering a

single mile of territory.”¹ In another place Mussolini asserted that “there can be imperialism without any empire”. But these pronouncements were obviously meant for foreign consumption.

Although the imperialist idea has, from the very beginning, occupied a prominent place in Fascist theory, Mussolini, until 1935, avoided reference to particular countries as potential fields for Italian expansion. He vaguely referred to Asia and Africa as ‘the historic objectives of Italy’, but he did not mention Abyssinia particularly, until Italy’s military preparations were well advanced.

It was only in May, 1935, that Mussolini referred to the projected campaign in East Africa in these words : “I have reached the point for which you, my comrades, have, I am sure, been waiting. You have to consider the group of problems of which I have given you

1. Mussolini in *Enciclopedia Italiana*.

a survey, in relation to what may happen in East Africa and in relation to the attitudes States may take up when the time comes for them to show us a real friendship, not a superficial one based on words alone. But, in the first place we must rely upon ourselves.”¹

Shortly afterwards Mussolini became even more explicit. In defiance of world opinion, he declared his uncompromising policy towards Abyssinia in June, 1935 : “We have old and new scores to pay off ; we shall pay them off. We shall pay no attention to what may be said beyond our frontiers, because the judges of our interest, the guarantors of our future, are ourselves and ourselves only.”

In July he adopted a more aggressive tone : “Our decision is irrevocable. There can be no turning back. Government and nation are now engaged in a conflict

1. Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents on International Affairs*, (1935), vol. I, p. 176.

which they have decided to carry on to the bitter end. The Italians have always thrashed black people in warfare. The defeat at Adowa was an exception".¹

On October 2, a day before the outbreak of hostilities, Mussolini broadcast a most offensive speech in which he made no secret of the fact that the aim of the Fascist government was but one, viz. colonial expansion. "For many months," he said, "the wheel of destiny under the impulse of our calm determination moves towards a goal. In this last hour the rhythm has become faster and cannot now be stopped It is not only an army that marches towards its goal, but 44 million Italians who are marching in unison with this army, because an attempt is being made to commit the blackest injustice against them, that of refusing them a little place in the sun."²


1. Quoted by Emile Burns, *Abyssinia and Italy*. p. 12.

2. *ibid.*

Abyssinia seemed to be the ideal object for the first great imperialist adventure of Fascist Italy. Where else could Mussolini find a more suitable field for expansion and an easier prey to Italian might.

For reasons of geography, Asia minor and Arabia, apart from Africa, attract the attention of Imperialist Italy. These are the territories, in which Italy, ever since her Unification, has taken a good deal of interest. The Turkey of Mustafa Kemal, however, is somewhat different from the decaying Ottoman Empire of pre-War days. Even dictators are not so reckless; even autocrats do not go to war unless victory seems probable.

As regards Arabia, the best territories came under British or French control after the World War. Syria and Palestine, are not available without war with France and Britain. Italy has continuously claimed these two countries. But it was not to be expected that either



Italy in Africa

France or Britain would, of its own free will, withdraw from there and present Italy with a mandate.

Italy, in recent years, tried to extend her influence in the Arabian peninsula by her active support of the Imam of Yemen against Ibn-i-Saud, who in his turn was supported by Great Britain. The War of 1934 between the two Arab rulers showed that Italy had backed the wrong horse. With the defeat of the Imam of Yemen and his acceptance of unfavourable terms Fascist penetration of Arabia came to an abrupt end.¹

Africa alone was thus left, and here again only those territories which were not directly or indirectly under the control of powerful states or their proteges. Such territories were but two, Abyssinia and Liberia; and of the two Abyssinia was by far the larger, richer

1. The history of this war may be read in Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (1934), or in Epstein, *Annual Register* (1934).

and more suitable for colonization. Besides, unlike Liberia, it was adjacent to Italian possessions.

Abyssinia or Ethiopia, as it used to be officially called, is a vast country, three times as large as Italy. Its area is, at a conservative estimate, 350,000 sq. miles.' As regards its population, reliable and exact figures are not available and it may be anything between five and ten million. The *Statesman's Year Book* considers 5,500,000 as a reasonably correct figure.

Topographically and climatically Ethiopia may be divided into three distinct parts. A large area in the East consists of deserts where the climate is unbearably hot and water very scarce. It is totally unfit for cultivation and the question of European colonization in this area does not arise. Then there are tropical areas, lying in the North, West and South which, though fertile, are very

1. *Statesman's Year Book* (1936).

malarial and unhealthy, the climate being extremely damp. In the middle is the high plateaux which in some places rises to an altitude of about 10,000 feet. Here the climate is dry. This portion of Ethiopia is suitable for the settlement of Europeans.

As yet there is no exact knowledge about the natural resources of the country, but they are believed to be considerable. The land is very suitable for the cultivation of coffee, cereals, beans and cotton. Because of the undeveloped state of the country, of primitive agricultural methods and of the feudal system, production of agricultural commodities has not been large. The Italians hope to increase the agricultural output with the help of advanced and scientific methods of agriculture, and thereby make Italy independent of foreign imports in most of the agricultural commodities.

It is impossible to estimate the

mineral wealth of Abyssinia. Exaggerated stories are told about the quantities of precious metals hidden in this country. This much is certain, however, that gold and platinum are found in Abyssinia in fairly large quantities. As to whether petroleum may be found there or not, opinions differ.

Apart from economic considerations, Italy believes in her civilizing mission. Abyssinia where life is "brutish, nasty and short," has consistently refused European "help" in the work of civilization because she was always suspicious about the real motives of the European powers. As late as 1865, Negus Theodore II told the French representative :

"I know the tactics of European Governments when they desire to acquire an Eastern State. First they send out missionaries, then consuls to support the missionaries, then battalions to support the consuls. I am not a rajah of Hindusthan to be made a mock of in that way :

I prefer to have to deal with the battalians right away".¹

But Italy is anxious to make her contribution to civilisation, to abolish slave-traffic-king and slave-owning, and to convert a primitive and feudal people into an advanced nation.

"The War", in the words of Signor Rossini, one of the big men of Fascism, "perhaps has economic reasons. But chiefly the reasons are moral and political. France did not acquire colonies because she was overpopulated. Nor did England. Economic problems are important, but nations cannot live solely on economic considerations. Italy can make a new contribution to civilisation. A new regime could certainly improve conditions in Abyssinia. Mussolini has created a new nation which has a right to contribute towards civilisation".²

1. Quoted by L. S. Woolf, *Empire and Commerce in Africa*, p. 145.

2. *New Statesman and Nation*, January 4, 1936, p. 7.

National Prestige also demands that Italy must possess a first class empire. There is no better way of asserting her greatness.

Fascist Italy had been waiting for the day when her military preparations would be complete and the international situation suitable for an imperialist adventure. Long ago Mussolini had prophesied : "Between 1935 and 1940, when we shall reach the crucial point in European history, we shall be able to make our voice heard and see at last our rights acknowledged."

At last that time had come. How amazingly correct was Mussolini's prediction. Not only was Italy now well prepared for war, but the international situation was very favourable.

Two great Powers apart from Italy have been interested in Abyssinia and the adjacent territories for a long time. The first European Power to interest itself in this part of Africa was France.

French capital began to penetrate Egypt in 1850's ; and France was the first European country to establish a foothold on the coast between the Red Sea and Abyssinia in 1862, which came to be known as French Somaliland. The dream of the French imperialists was to have an Empire so extensive as to cover practically the whole of Africa north of the equator.

Great Britain, after 1875, when Disraeli purchased 176,602 shares of the Suez Canal Company from the Khedive, became vitally interested in this region. The purchase of the shares was followed by British intervention in Egyptian finance, which, in its turn, led to the occupation of that country in 1882. By 1898 the British had also firmly established themselves in the Soudan. But the prosperity of Egypt and Soudan depended on the Nile and the Nile had its main source in Abyssinia. In 1884 Great Britain seized the strip of coast

in the east of Abyssinia, which was to develop into British Somaliland. Shortly afterwards Italy, as we already know, acquired not only Eritrea but the territory, called Italian Somaliland.

The encirclement of Abyssinia was now complete. Since this time Abyssinia has naturally attracted the attention of the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy. And if Abyssinia retained her independence, until recently, it was because the three powers could not agree among themselves about the division of the estates after her demise. Even after the whole of the African continent had been divided among European powers, Abyssinia continued to enjoy independence.

It is not necessary to go through the whole history of the various attempts made in the past to partition Abyssinia. Until 1904, when Franco-British understanding was established, Great Britain seriously thought of dividing the country

into British and Italian spheres of influence. By the agreements of 1891 and 1894 Great Britain recognized a large part of Abyssinia as an Italian sphere of influence. France was to be excluded from all share in the spoils. She, therefore, came to the help of Abyssinia against Italy and the result was the disaster of Adowa in 1896, which was followed by a marked increase of French influence in Abyssinia.

In 1906, when Great Britain and France had already come to an understanding among themselves and when they were afraid of Germany's colonial plans, yet another agreement was concluded between Great Britain, France and Italy. The three Powers guaranteed the territorial *status quo* of Abyssinia, and promised joint support in their economic penetration of the country. Special interest of every one of these Powers was mutually recognized. But owing to the critical international

situation, Abyssinia succeeded in holding out against making any far-reaching economic concessions to these nations.

After the World War, the rift between France and Great Britain once more grew deep. In spite of the Pact of London, Italy had been left "out when the redistribution of Africa took place after the War. Both the countries, France and Italy, despite their mutual rivalry, now began to oppose British penetration of Abyssinia. They encouraged the Negus in his policy of resisting the extension of British influence. They supported Abyssinia's entry into the League of Nations in 1923. The co-operation between France and Italy, however, could not last long, based as it was not on a sincere desire to help a weak country but on interests which could not be easily reconciled. Great Britain succeeded in winning over Italy to her side. The two countries once more agreed in 1926 to recognize each other's special

interests in Abyssinia, and once more France proved to be the great stumbling block in the execution of their plan.

In 1928 an independent move was made by Italy. A new treaty of friendship was concluded between Abyssinia and Italy. Both the parties undertook to settle all disputes that might arise by peaceful means and "without having recourse to armed force."

The story of Abyssinia's relations with the European countries shows clearly that it was primarily France which had so far prevented Abyssinia from becoming a vassal of Italy and Great Britain. But in January 1935, the policy of France underwent a radical change. Indeed ever since January 1933, when the Nazi regime was established in Germany, the hostility between France and Italy seemed to be giving place to a better understanding between the two Latin nations. This was a very important change in inter-European relations.

France has always been afraid of Germany ; but she became particularly nervous after Hitler siezed the reins of power. Hitler's attitude towards France was well-known. She became alarmed at the marvellous recovery of Germany and her rearmament on an enormous scale. France seemed to be willing to sacrifice her interests in the colonial world in face of a serious threat nearer home.

Italy on her side, had been generally in sympathy with Germany throughout the post-War period. Mussolini might have welcomed the dictatorship of Hitler, for more than one reason. Fascism and National Socialism were so alike, and Hitler such a great admirer of Mussolini that under ordinary circumstances this change in Germany should have resulted in even greater friendship between the two countries. But there was one item in the programme of Hitler which disturbed Mussolini's peace of mind. Austro-German Union was one of the

avowed aims of the Nazis. Italy, however, could not tolerate the presence of such a formidable state on her own borders, which, at a future date, might be in a position to take away from her what she had achieved as a result of the Great War. How could Mussolini believe that Nazi Germany, once she had absorbed Austria, would not claim the South Tyrol. And if Germany had the South Tyrol, not only would the industrial backbone of Italy be threatened, but Trieste, Fiume and the whole of Adriatic would be at her mercy.

It was this factor which brought Italy and France nearer each other.

In January, 1935, the Rome Pact was concluded, by which the two governments showed a united front in Europe and settled their differences in Africa. In regard to Austria, they undertook to consult each other in case the independence of that country should be menaced. In the colonial sphere, frontier rectifi-

cations were made in favour of Italy. Territories, considerable in size, though not of much economic value, were added to Libya and Eritrea. Italy also received 2,500 shares in the Jibouti-Addis Ababa railway. Moreover, France granted certain concessions to the Italians living in Tunis.¹ All these concessions were made because of Hitler. France, as a result of the *rapprochement* with Italy, felt secure about her "Alpine frontiers." She could now concentrate her attention on the north-east.

Abyssinia as such was not mentioned in the Rome Pact. Later on it was alleged that according to certain articles that were kept secret, France had given Italy a *carte blanche* with regard to Abyssinia. Be it as it may, Italy's subsequent aggressive policy and the French attitude towards it showed

1. The agreement is given in Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents on International Affairs*, 1935, vol. 1.

clearly that France was not going to interfere with the plans of Mussolini.

Italy blamed Abyssinia for a policy of open antagonism towards Italy. Italians have pointed out that Italy had tried her best to carry out a policy of co-operation and good neighbourliness with Abyssinia, but the Negus taking advantage of this policy made preparations for war with Italy and seriously thought of attacking Italian possessions in East Africa.¹ A proposition difficult to believe. But the fact cannot be denied that during the post-War period, particularly during the last few years, the relations between the two countries were strained due to frontier incidents that occurred in rapid succession.

The most serious incident was that which occurred at Wal-Wal on the 5th December, 1934.² While there is no

1. R. Forges-Davanzati in *Current History*, October, 1935.

2. *American Journal of International Law*, January 1936, for a review of the Wal-Wal incident by Potter.

doubt that Wal-Wal, even according to Italian maps, published before the incident, was placed within Abyssinian territory, it is equally true that Italians had been in actual possession of the wells for some years. There had been a controversy as regards the frontier between Italian Somaliland and Ogaden, which is common in desert regions. On the 5th of December Abyssinian troops attacked the Italians, who withdrew, only to attack the next day when reinforcements had arrived. The Abyssinians incurred severe losses.

When shortly afterwards the Italian Government forwarded to the Negus a Note of protest in connection with this incident, he requested them to settle the dispute by means of arbitration, which would be in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty of 1928, concluded between Italy and Ethiopia. But Mussolini refused to accept this suggestion. Abyssinia appealed on January 15, 1935, to the

Council of the League of Nations under Article 15 of the Covenant. A fresh appeal was made by the Abyssinian Government on March 17. The Council in the meantime devoted its efforts to committing the parties to settle the dispute among themselves and finally, on August 3, secured the consent of the parties to refer the matter to an arbitral tribunal. The Commission gave its award on September 3. It found neither party responsible for this incident. But the award did not satisfy Italy.

On September 6, 1935, the Council of the League appointed a Committee of Five, consisting of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Spain, Poland and Turkey, to make a general examination of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and to seek a pacific settlement in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant. The task entrusted to the Committee was not an easy one ; and after about a fortnight it confessed its failure.

Then the Council decided to prepare a report, which should include "a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto." A Committee of the Council consisting of all its members, with the exception of Italy, was entrusted with this task. But before the report of this Committee was ready on October 5, hostilities had already broken out.

On October 3rd, 1935, began the Italo-Abyssinian War with the bombardment by Italian areoplanes of Adowa and Adigrat, and the advance of Italian troops from Eritrea. The hostilities began without any regular declaration of war, which seems to have become the usual custom nowadays. The reason for the invasion, given by the Italian Government, in a communique, was: 'Self-defence'. It was "in order to repel the imminent Abyssinian threat" that the Italian troops had crossed the frontier.

What was this "imminent Abyssinian threat"? Obviously the mobilization order issued by the Negus. But it is no secret that the order was given after Italy had made the most thorough preparations for the War for more than seven months, after large and well equipped Italian forces had gathered on Abyssinian frontiers and were just waiting for orders from the Duce to strike, and after the most modern weapons of destruction had been pouring into Eritrea and Italian Somaliland for a considerable time.

From the very beginning it was an unequal fight. The Abyssinian troops, ill fed, ill equipped and without any regular training could not indefinitely resist the great military power of Italy, thoroughly reorganized under the Fascist regime. On one side there were only rifles, many of them as old as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, on the other most modern weapons of warfare, tanks and areoplanes and poison gas and all that modern science

has invented for the destruction of man. The Abyssinian army was organized on a feudal basis, each tribe following its own local chieftain in battle, and for this reason alone it could not stand against the Fascist war machine, completely centralized, responsible to one person, and moving like one man.

Moreover, in spite of this overwhelming superiority, Italy adopted, particularly when she saw that the progress was slow, all possible means, fair and unfair, of crushing the enemy. Where Italian arms failed, Italian money succeeded. Local chiefs were bribed and won over. Italy, which had signed the Geneva Convention of 1929, used poison gas in warfare and bombarded hospitals.

Although the War continues in a sense to the time of writing (December 1936), for all practical purposes Italy became the mistress of Abyssinia when the Emperor fled to Palestine (May 1, 1936), from where he proceeded to

England, and when Addis Ababa fell, (May 5, 1936). A brave but primitive people after a desperate fight for the preservation of their independence, which lasted for seven months, had no option but to surrender before a superior organization and technique.

The League failed in preventing the outbreak of war between Italy and Abyssinia. It also failed in punishing the aggressor adequately, and bringing the war to an early end. But it does not mean that beyond declaring Italy as the aggressor, it did nothing, as in the case of the Sino-Japanese War. For the first time in its history the League decided to impose economic sanctions against Italy. It appointed several committees to formulate in detail and co-ordinate the economic sanctions against the Covenant-breaking State.

The sanctions actually imposed may be divided into four categories : 1. Prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition

and implements of war not only to Italy but to Abyssinia as well, 2. Certain financial measures particularly the stopping of loans and banking credits to Italy, 3. prohibition of importation of Italian goods, and 4. embargo on certain exports to Italy.¹

The sanctions were adopted not only because of British influence but because the smaller Powers wanted to test the system of collective security. They wanted to prove that aggression did not pay. Had sanctions proved to be really effective, the weaker States would have been relieved of their great anxiety for the future.

But unfortunately the system of sanctions was not given a fair trial. The

1. Wheeler-Bennett promises to give us all the relevant documents connected with the Italo-Abyssinian War in the second volume of *Documents on International Affairs* (1935). At present we have to collect this information from numerous publications of the League of Nations. Some of the Journals have also published a large number of original documents.

sanctions came a bit too late and even when they were imposed, the League carefully avoided the embargo on oil, which alone might have turned the tables. On the whole it can be said that the League handled the Abyssinian question in such a way as to lend itself into a ludicrous mess.

The League as an organization, the primary purpose of which was to promote world peace and prevent war, is dead. It failed in checking aggression and in saving a country which relied on it to the last. Indeed it would be no exaggeration to say that but for the ineffective interference of the League, we would still have at least a semi-independent Abyssinia.

That the Italo-Abyssinian War had a marked effect on Italo-British relations goes without saying. Great Britain has become thoroughly alarmed at what has happened. In the past, as we have seen, she had been encouraging Italy in her

colonial ambitions, because Italy was weak and was not considered to be a potential enemy. But the Italy of Mussolini is a different proposition. It is doubtful whether Italy will be satisfied with the conquest of Abyssinia. Perhaps Fascism will have to seek new goals—Egypt, Palestine and Yemen, if not India ! Great Britain has yielded Abyssinia without resistance, and has thereby encouraged Mussolini. But the “historic objectives” of Italy are two : Asia and Africa. One objective is at least partially realised. What about the second ?

Great Britain's interest in Abyssinia is great, but her interest in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea is even greater. Italy's hold of Abyssinia may come to mean her control of this vital line of communication, to which Great Britain cannot obviously be indifferent. When Mussolini declared, in November 1936,¹ that the Mediterranean was Italy's

1. Speech at Milan.

life and he threatened Great Britain that unless she recognized Italy's conquest of Abyssinia, and "respected our rights" she might have to meet with difficulties in the "Sea of Rome," the British Foreign Secretary promptly replied that to Britain the Mediterranean was not merely a short cut from one part of the Empire to another, but "an arterial route." "Freedom of communications in the Mediterranean," he went on, "was of vital interest to the British Commonwealth." ¹

Even France would now probably take a very different view of Fascist schemes of colonial expansion. She tolerated the annexation of Abyssinia by Italy because perhaps she felt that it was the price which she had to pay for Italian co-operation in Europe. The Franco-Italian *entente*, however, is not yet in sight. Mussolini played his diplo-

1. Mr. Eden in the House of Commons.

matic cards very well indeed. But that France would be duped again is difficult to believe.

It is unlikely that any future attempt to extend the empire of Italy will go unchallenged.

CHAPTER III

THE EXPANSION OF GERMANY

The problem of Germany's expansion has two distinct aspects : Colonial and Continental. Germany is demanding not only the restoration of her old colonies, but she is also looking with covetous eyes on her eastern neighbours. We shall try to understand both these aspects of German expansionist policy.

The colonial history of Germany is a history of only thirty years—1884 to 1914. During these three decades Germany demanded a place in the sun, acquired it and lost it.

But although German colonial history began as late as 1884, the German people were not without colonial traditions. They possessed considerable experience of exploration and settlement. In the Middle Ages their traders and settlers were extending German influence both by land and by sea. The Hanseatic League established trading stations in the Baltic and North Sea ports. Though

in the Age of Discovery the Germans did not take a prominent part in exploration, due largely to internal conflicts and geographical situation, yet their contribution was not altogether negligible¹. In the later part of the modern age, specially during the nineteenth century, German explorers did a good deal of work for foreign countries, and as regards emigration it has been estimated that several million people from the Germanic states went to America. German missions, trade and shipping were powerful factors in the extension of influence overseas.

It was in the nineteenth century that Germany gradually became an industrialist state. With the industrialization of Germany it was natural that the Germans should become interested in colonies. Many German writers prepared plans for the establishment of colonies. Influential publicists

1. Schäfer, *Kolonialgeschichte*, vol. ii.

became the champions of imperialism. Friedrich List, the famous German economist, wrote in 1841 : "Colonies are the best means of developing manufactures, export and import trade and finally a respectable navy." Treitschke, the most prominent of those historians who did so much to stimulate German nationalism, employed his powerful pen in the service of imperialism.

The establishment of German unity in 1871 gave a new impetus to the demand for colonies. A book, "*Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien ?*", (Does Germany require colonies ?), was written by Fabri and published in 1879. The book was destined to influence German opinion as few books have done. Fabri criticized German emigration to America which he considered as an ominous symptom of an economic crisis, and pleaded for the establishment of a colonial empire which would provide Germany with markets for her goods, fields of investment for

her capital and outlets for her surplus population. Fabri also suggested the method of acquiring colonies. He thought that commercial penetration should come first and then the flag should follow the trader.

Wilhelm Hübbe-Schleiden was another prominent propagandist. He wrote a large number of books on the necessity of German expansion, of which his *Studien über West-Afrika* (1879) and *Deutsche Kolonisation* (1881) are important. He exhorted his fellow-countrymen to think "imperially". In 1879 Ernst von Weber published an article in which he urged the German Government to obtain Delagoa Bay from Portugal and to encourage German emigration to Transvaal, and to acquire gradually an imperial possession, extending to the Zambesi. About the same time Treitschke wrote: In the South of Africa circumstances are decidedly favourable to us. English colonial policy, which

has been successful everywhere else, has not succeeded in the Cape. The civilization which exists there is Teutonic, is Dutch. If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision between our interests and those of England is unavoidable.”¹

Missionary societies also participated in the propaganda. Not only was Fabri an inspector of the Barmen Rhine Mission which had established many centres in South-West Africa, but the German missionaries in general felt the need of governmental protection and demanded it.

The arguments of the imperialists had little effect on Bismarck, and for a long time he resisted the temptation to establish a colonial empire.

The architect of the new Reich was perfectly aware of its weak points. The central idea of his policy was to consolidate what had been achieved. He

1. Quoted by Dawson, *The German Empire*, vol. ii, p. 178.

sought only security and the preservation of *status quo*. He knew France would take the earliest opportunity to undo the work of 1871. It was necessary to be on good terms with Britain. Moreover, he felt that the building up of a colonial empire was bound to be a costly affair, both in men and money, and Germany in the then stage of her development could not afford it. He declared that "for Germany to acquire colonies would be like a poverty-stricken Polish nobleman providing himself with silks and sables when he needed shirts." Bismarck was exclusively interested in Europe. Even in an industrial age he wished to follow the maxim of Frederick the Great who had said: "All distant possessions are a burden to the State. A village on the frontier is worth more than a principality two hundred and fifty miles away."

For a few years after the establishment of the German Empire Bismarck

continued to oppose colonial expansion. He argued somewhat like this. Colonies could not be acquired, and if acquired, could not be retained without a big navy. A big navy would divert money from the army, which he considered to be much more necessary for the protection of the Fatherland. Besides, what was even more important, this would antagonize Great Britain, a situation which he was determined to avoid. During the period of his Chancellorship he took all pains to cultivate the friendship of Great Britain. And he knew well that German colonial and naval expansion was bound to arouse the hostility of the British. He thought it advisable, therefore, that Germany should remain a land power, and not challenge British supremacy on sea. He was sure that there could be "no war between a land rat and a water rat." He encouraged the other nations, particularly France, to acquire colonies since it would leave him a freer hand

in Europe, and involve them in international conflicts.

Yet in 1884-85 Bismarck acquired the larger portion of Germany's colonial Empire.' This was due to the changed internal and external situation of Germany. Elections for the Reichstag were impending. There was much hostile criticism of Bismarck's social and economic policies. The German people had begun "to think imperially" and were now demanding a place in the sun. Germany's trade had greatly expanded. There was a rapid increase in population. The extraordinary energy of the German people was now seeking an outlet. The old arguments on the need for raw materials and markets were being continuously advanced. German colonial enthusiasts could now also point to the

1. On the acquisition of colonies the following books give useful information: Townsend, *Origins of Modern German Colonization*; Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments*; Brandenburg, *From Bismarck to the World War*; von Hagen, *Bismarcks Kolonialpolitik*.

renewed and vigorous activity of other nations in this sphere. Great Britain was active in Egypt, East and West Africa. The French had seized Tunis in 1881. Even the Italians were busy in founding colonies on the Western shores of the Red Sea. Germany had either to act promptly or be satisfied with the status of a second-rate power. Two societies, Kolonialverein and Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation, came into existence.

The Kolonialverein was founded in 1882. Among its founders were explorers, merchants, geographers and travellers. It was a very powerful organization, and within a couple of years it had ten thousand members, many of whom were influential men, such as Fabri, Hübner-Schleiden, Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg and others. The society carried on an intense propaganda in favour of imperialism.

The Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonisation was founded by Carl Peters in

1884. It was not merely an agency of propaganda ; its aim was to raise capital for the establishment of colonies. Carl Peters actually raised four million marks capital and left Germany for East Africa where he proposed to buy land for German emigrants.

The Societies were amalgamated in the deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft (1887). These societies converted the country to imperialism. The press was on their side. Not only for economic reasons, but for reasons of national prestige it was considered essential that the country should possess a first-class colonial Empire.

In 1884, the international situation seemed to be favourable for a colonial adventure. Germany and Austria-Hungary had concluded an alliance in 1879 which three years later (1882) developed into the well-known Triple Alliance when Italy joined the Teutonic Powers. Germany's possible opponents had not

yet come to an understanding among themselves. The Triple Entente of France, Russia and Great Britain was still a long way off. Indeed Bismarck hoped to prevent an understanding between France and Great Britain by raising the colonial question.

In April 1884 Bismarck placed the settlement of a German merchant, named Lüderitz, in South-West Africa under the protection of the Government. What happened was this. Difficulties had arisen about traders and missionaries who had settled themselves in Damara-land and Namaqualand in South-West Africa. They demanded British protection when they found themselves in conflict with the indigenous population. But the British Government, which had annexed Walfish Bay, was not prepared to extend its authority any farther in that region. At last, in 1883, a German merchant, named Lüderitz, asked his Government whether they would support

him if he hoisted the German flag at Angra Pequena, which subsequently came to be known as Lüderitzbucht. Thereupon Bismarck inquired of the British Government whether it claimed this territory. The British Government, after a long time, informed Germany that although it did not claim sovereignty over the territory in question, it would consider such a claim by any other state as an infringement of its "legitimate rights". Bismarck then asked it to prove the existence of its rights, to which the British Government did not reply. Bismarck after waiting for four months proclaimed a protectorate over the whole coast between the Orange River and Angra Pequena, which was, after some controversy, recognized by Great Britain. The protectorate developed into the important colony of German South-West Africa.

This was how the German colonial Empire began. Within a short period

of six years Germany could claim a fairly large empire in Africa and the Pacific. After the fall of Bismarck in 1890, though much was heard about the *Weltpolitik* of Kaiser Wilhelm II and German colonial ambitions, actually few new acquisitions were made.

As Bismarck had feared, the establishment of the German Colonial Empire necessitated the creation of a powerful navy, which in its turn led to Anglo-German estrangement. Great Britain would not have participated in the World War but for the colonial ambitions and naval power of Germany.

Ultimately the German colonies had an area of about a million square miles with a population of about fifteen million. In Africa there were three principal possessions—German West Africa consisting of the Camaroons and Togoland, South-West Africa and last though not least German East Africa. In the Pacific Germany had Shantung and a large

number of smaller islands. German colonies used to supply, though not in large quantities, certain valuable products to the mother country—cotton, rubber, coffee and tobacco, for example.

We give below a list of the more important products of the German colonies :

German East Africa : Sisal—fibrous plant, maize, tea, tobacco, coffee and gold.

South West Africa : Diamonds, copper, some gold, tin and vanadium concentrates, tungsten.

Cameroon : Palm oil, hides, cocoa, ivory, almonds, some gold.

Togoland : Cocoa.

It must, however, be borne in mind that those colonies, at the time when they were lost, could not be considered as either important markets for Germany's goods or as sources of her imports. For before the War, in 1912 and 1913 they took only 0.6 per cent of Germany's

total exports and they provided only 0.5 per cent of all Germany's imports in each of these years'.

The colonies did not serve as useful outlets for Germany's surplus population either. It has been estimated that on January 1, 1913, there were only about 20,000 Germans in all the German colonies taken together, whereas in the period 1904-13 Germany's annual average increase of population was 733,500 persons, and the annual number of German emigrants 25,624¹. Curiously the number of Germans in all the German colonies was smaller than the number of Germans in the city of Paris². This was because most of the colonies had very unhealthy climates. The only possible exception was Tanganyika and even this territory never attracted a large number of German emigrants.

1. *The Economist*, April 18, 1936, p. 120.

2. *Ibid*, p. 119.

3. *The Economist*, November 16, 1935, p. 950.

The administration of the colonies was a considerable burden on the German tax-payer. The combined expenditure on the colonies in 1912 apart from the huge expenditure on the navy which was directly connected with colonial possessions, was £4,323,000 as compared with the total revenue of £2,448,000¹.

On the administration of these colonies much was written during and immediately after the World War. The contention of the Allies was that Germany had miserably failed as a trustee of the inhabitants of the colonies. She misgoverned those territories and had no right to retain them. The Germans of course strongly repudiated these accusations. Books written before the World War or long after the War are better guides for students of history than those works of a controversial nature. Old works, as well as recent books show that there was nothing

1. *The Economist*, November 16, 1935, p. 951.

exceptionally wrong with the administration of the German colonies, specially after 1906 when a regular Colonial Office was established in Berlin which was placed in the hands of Dr. Dernberg.

In the early stages of German colonization, however, there are to be found many abuses. Serious mistakes were made first by the Chartered Companies, which were responsible for the government of the colonies while Bismarck was Chancellor, and then by the German Government itself which took control of colonial government after the dismissal of Bismarck.

In South-West Africa, as well as in other German colonial possessions, the Germans in the beginning adopted an impolitic policy which resulted in a number of rebellions. The most serious of these rebellions was that of the Hereros. The war that ensued was long and was fought on both sides with unusual ferocity. General von Trotha

resorted to exceptionally cruel methods. But it must be said to the credit of the German Government that it did not support him and he was obliged to resign¹.

The Herero campaign and the adventures of Carl Peters, the enthusiastic pioneer of imperialism in Germany, were cited during the World War as proof of the brutality of German colonial policy. But it was unfair to suppose that such abuses were peculiar to German imperialism. A study of the colonial history of any of the European nations would demonstrate that the colonial policy of Germany was not very different from that of other countries.

As regards the contention of the Allies that the moral and material progress of their colonies had been neglected by the German Government, it should be enough to point out that a period of thirty years is too short for the

1. Townsend, *Origins of Modern German Colonization*.

development of primitive countries.' Still the achievement of Germany was not negligible, and its value was recognized by competent authorities. Sir H. H. Johnston, for instance, wrote in 1913 : "They (the Germans) are quick to realize their own defects and equally quick to amend them. As in commerce, so in government, they observe, learn and master the best principles. The politician would be very short-sighted who underrated the greatness of the German character, or reckoned on the evanescence of German dominion in strange lands". Still on the false assumption of Germany's inability to govern the colonies properly, she was ousted from the colonial field by the Treaty of Versailles.


By articles 118 and 119 of this treaty, Germany renounced all her rights over

1. Townsend, *Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire*.

2. *History of the Colonization of Africa*.

the colonies and overseas possessions in favour of the principal Allied and Associated Powers. They were assigned to Great Britain, including some of her Dominions, France, Belgium and Japan. But it was said that they were to be governed according to a new and worthy doctrine. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations laid down that "to those colonies and territories.....which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization." For this reason, "the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations." The tutelage was to be exercised by them as mandatories of the League of Nations.

German South-West Africa was assigned by the Treaty to the Union of South Africa. German East Africa went



The former colonies of Germany

to Great Britain and Belgium, Great Britain getting the larger share. West Africa was divided between Great Britain and France. The general result of the Partition of Africa was that of $12\frac{1}{2}$ million people under Germany, 42 per cent went over to the British Empire, 33 per cent to France and 25 per cent to Belgium. In the Pacific the islands lying in the North of the equator were handed over to Japan, those to the South of the equator, to the British Empire or its Dominions. Of these territories German East Africa and German West Africa belong to B class Mandates, which means that they retain their separate political existence, and are not to become integral parts of the territories of the Mandatory Powers. All the other former German possessions belong to C class Mandates, *i. e.* they are to be administered under the laws of the Mandatory Power as integral portions of its territory.

This was, in short, on what President Wilson had insisted in his Fourteen Points, "a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims."

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, there was resentment in Germany at its exclusion from the colonial field. In spite of the republican character of the new regime and the progress of Socialism in Germany during this period, there were people who strove to secure for Germany a colonial system which might replace the one that was lost by the war. A small but ardent movement was maintained. Appeals were made to National egotism : "Germany needed room to expand. Germany must be large like the other Powers." When the Germans saw that every nation of any pretension, even Belgium, Holland and Portugal possessed extensive empires, they regarded the loss of their colonies as a deep and open

wound to their national pride. German pride was further wounded by the declaration of the Allies that Germany was unfit to govern backward peoples.

The number of Germans who continued to press for the return of the Colonies was small,* but they were all very active. Dr. Schacht and Dr. Schenee¹ were conspicuous in this agitation. The *Koloniale Gesellschaft* established a large number of branches to spread the propaganda. Two magazines—*Kolonial Rundschau* and *Kolonialdeutsche*—devoted themselves exclusively to colonial problems. Hundreds of pamphlets were published lest German interest in colonization should die. Conservative newspapers consistently supported the movement. The German Government, too, on several occasions indirectly put forward Germany's claim to a share in

1. Dr. Heinrich Schnee wrote a book on the subject which has been translated into English, *German Colonization Past and Future* (London 1926).

the colonial world. When, for instance, Stresemann first applied for the membership of the League of Nations, he put forward as one of the four conditions the recognition by the League of the right of Germany to participate in the mandatory system ; and on May 20, 1927," Germany made a move to secure a seat on the Mandates Commission.

Germany remained watchful of the status of her mandated colonies. When Belgium incorporated Ruanda-Urundi into the Belgian Congo, Germany protested. British desire to incorporate German East Africa into her African possessions met with German opposition, and German newspapers on many occasions remarked caustically on the British tendency to speak of mandates as British colonies.

While these demands were being made by the nationalist parties and moderate governments, the parties of the extreme Left remained critical of

imperialism in any form. The Communists and Socialists were committed to an anti-imperialist policy. They did not wish to have any more colonial empires. Curiously, they were supported in this policy by the National Socialists, though for very different reasons.

Hitler, like Bismarck for so many years, was a confirmed opponent of German colonial expansion. In his autobiography he pleads for territorial acquisitions in Europe as against what he calls a policy of "colonial trade." He recognizes the necessity of expansion. But he says that "the sole hope of success for a territorial policy now-a-days is to confine it to Europe, and not to extend it to places such as the Cameroons." And again, "We have finished with the pre-War policy of colonies and trade, and are going over to the land policy of the future." He strongly criticizes the pre-War colonial policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II. It was folly," he says, "to use up our national

strength for such objects without first ensuring our position in Europe. An aspiration of that sort is one of those stupidities which in politics go by the name of crimes." The present large colonial empires do not appeal to him, as they did not appeal to Frederick the Great and Bismarck. "Many European states to-day," he asserts, "are like pyramids standing on their points. Their possessions in Europe are ridiculous compared with their top-heavy burden of colonies, foreign trade etc. One might say : point in Europe, base all over the world." He compares these Empires with the American Union, "whose base covers its own continent and whose apex is its point of contact with the rest of the Globe. Hence the vast internal strength of that State and the weakness of most European colonizing Powers." The Germans require territory for settlement, and colonies are "useless for that object." This territory should be such as will "not only keep the

new settlers in close communication with the land of their origin but will guarantee to the combination all the advantages arising from the size of the united whole." He seemed to be interested only in the creation of a German land Empire.

In official National Socialist ideology there was no room for colonies. The establishment of a racial state was the ideal. It was asserted by a Nazi Sociologist that whereas Italian Fascism stood for the imperialist idea National Socialism believed in what he called the "federal" theory, meaning thereby the consolidation of the German peoples now scattered in so many countries of Europe'. Hitler, like Bismarck, thought that the creation of a colonial Empire would antagonize Britain. But friendship with Britain was to be one of the basic ideas of his foreign policy. How could he build up a colonial Empire and at the same time retain the goodwill of Britain? How

1. W. Eschmann in *Hochschule und Ausland*, April 1934.

could he fight Russia—a war with which he considered inevitable—unless he was assured at least of British neutrality, if not of assistance ?

What is this Nazi “Federal” Plan, and what is the nature of Germany’s policy of expansion on the Continent ? All the Germans must be brought under the German flag. Economic need and national honour make expansion unavoidable. Alfred Rosenberg, the party expert on foreign affairs writes : “Racial honour demands territory and enough of it..... In such a struggle there can be no consideration for worthless Poles, Czechs, etc. Ground must be cleared for German peasants.”

Clemenceau once said : “There are twenty million too many Germans in the world.” Hitler’s dream is the unification of all Germans. The establishment of a unified racial state is the fundamental aim of the Nazis. All the Germans must be brought within the Nordic Third

Reich. It has been estimated that there are over 85 million Germans in Europe, out of which 65 million live in the German Reich.¹ Twenty million Germans are, at present, the subjects or citizens (as the case may be) of twenty foreign states. They are distributed as follows :—

Austria—6,300,000 ; Czechoslovakia—3,500,000 ; Switzerland—2,860,000 ; France—1,700,000 ; Poland—1,350,000 ; Russia—1,000,000 ; Rumania—800,000 ; Jugoslavia—700,000 ; Hungary—600,000 ; Danzig—360,000 ; Italy—300,000 ; Luxemburg—250,000 ; Belgium—150,000 ; Lithuania—131,000 ; Holland—80,000 ; Latvia—75,000 ; Denmark—60,000 ; Estonia—30,000 ; Lichtenstein—12,000.

Obviously Nazi Germany cannot fight all these twenty states of which three are Great Powers. She has to differentiate between the important and the less important of her objectives.

1. *Sprachenkarte von Mittel-Europa.*

The Nazis consider the situation to be particularly unsatisfactory in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Danzig, Lithuania and above all Russia. With regard to other countries, Germany has either reconciled herself with the situation, or does not consider it to be 'sufficiently important. In short, Germany is to adopt the old policy of '*Drang nach Osten*.'

Of the states affected by the World War none suffered so severely as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This empire, which, for a century, had occupied a unique place in European polity, was literally wiped out. The composite Empire was dissolved into a number of small nation-states. As a result of the dissolution, Austria has been reduced to a State of $6\frac{1}{2}$ million people, of whom over two million live in Vienna, the capital. She has now become a landlocked state, having no territorial access to the sea. Living in Austria is expensive and means of employment few. At

present Austria presents to Europe a very difficult problem indeed. It is now surrounded on all sides by hostile States. These States, formerly possessions of the Dual Monarchy, have adopted a policy of economic protection with a vengeance. Austria is deprived of her natural sources of supply and of markets for her finished goods. Her economic condition, as a consequence, has been deplorable and has been a cause of uneasiness not only to herself but to other countries. Have not the economists traced the origin of the British monetary crisis of 1931 to the failure of the Credit-Anstalt ?

The economic distress has produced a social condition in Austria that is extremely serious. Suicides are more numerous than in any other Western country. The number of beggars is on the increase. Vienna, the great cultural centre in Europe, next only to Paris, is a decaying town. I wonder who said

it first that Germany's condition was serious but not hopeless, Austria's hopeless but not serious ! There seems to be little hope of any improvement in the condition of Austria unless drastic remedies are applied.

Three solutions of the difficult Austrian problem have been suggested. Austria may continue to live only if she either joins one of her powerful neighbours, Germany and Italy, in an economic if not political union or she joins a federation of the Succession States. These are the three proposed solutions of the Austrian problem. Every one of them is favoured by one of the Great Powers. Germany is anxious that Austria should join her. Italy wishes that she should remain subservient to her and in any case should not become a part of Greater Germany. France would wish her to become a member of some loose federation of the Succession States.

Of all these solutions the one that seems to be natural is an Austro-German Union, the so called *Anschluss*. But this has been prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles (Art. 80) and the Treaty of St. Germain (Art. 88). That this Union can be permanently avoided is highly improbable. All Germans agree that the Union must be accomplished. Even before the coming of Hitler, an attempt was made by the German Government to establish a Customs Union (1931)¹. But, due to the opposition of France and Italy, the plan had to be abandoned.

Curiously enough, when Hitler, an Austrian by birth and a fervent advocate of the *Anschluss*, became supreme, the movement for a Union of the two Germanic peoples received a set-back. The Austrians did not like to join Nazi Germany, where Socialism had been tabooed and Catholicism was being

1. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs* (1931) for the projected union.

persecuted. The Austrian Government, first under Dollfuss, then under Schuschnigg, adopted a pro-Italian policy. Austrian Nazis were ruthlessly persecuted.

Recently, however, a change has come in the attitude of Austria. Von Papen, it seems, has succeeded in bringing about a *rapprochement* between the two German-speaking nations (1936). This means an increase of German influence in Austria. Although the agreement was concluded with the knowledge and consent of Mussolini, it is clear that Italy now has begun to realise that her hold on Austria is slipping. The only effective way of upsetting the schemes of Hitler is the restoration of the Habsburg monarchy.

Unless the restoration takes place, it seems unlikely that a Union between Germany and Austria will be obstructed, indefinitely. Had the desire for a union been based on sentiment alone, perhaps

it would not come. Or, if interest alone required a union, it need not be necessarily accomplished. But in this case both sentiment and interest demand a union. It will be difficult for Italy and other countries to prevent it for a long time.

Nazi Germany has an eye upon yet another country. The Third Reich is hungrily looking at the rich territories of Western Czechoslovakia. In a total population of less than 15 millions there are about 3 million Germans in Czechoslovakia, by far the largest German minority in any country. The Germans live in the most highly industrialized districts of Czechoslovakia. They are well-organized. The Suddeutsche Heimatfront under the leadership of Henlein is a force to reckon with. Specially during the last two years, it has made considerable progress, and since May 1935 forms the second largest party (44 seats to the 45 of the Czech Agrarian Party) in the legislature. The party is openly carrying on propaganda

for the autonomy of their province but secretly it is closely connected with the Nazi party in Germany, and desires incorporation in the Reich. The rise of this movement is due to the antagonism between the Germans and the Czechs and Slovaks. The Germans find it difficult to reconcile themselves with the privileged position of the Czechs in the government of the Country. Nazi propaganda—through newspapers and radio—is a powerful factor in organizing opposition to the Czechoslovak Government. In the trial of the *Prager Presse*, which took place in September 1935, it was established that Henlein had received large sums of money for his party from German sources, and that the movement of which he was the leader was a direct offspring of German Nazism.'

Czechoslovakia is naturally perturbed over Nazi intentions. She is worried

1. Hanighen in *Current History*, March 1936.



Central and Eastern Europe

about German fortifications on her frontier. She will do all that lies in her power to prevent an Austro-German Union. She is now a dependable ally of France and Russia.

Although Herr Hitler concluded with Poland a Non-aggression Pact shortly after the Nazi regime was established, the causes of her discontent have not been removed and they are capable of precipitating a crisis at any moment.

The reconstitution of Poland at the Peace Conference of Paris involved the disintegration of Prussia. The new Poland includes practically all that was taken by her unscrupulous neighbours in the eighteenth century and more. Posen, West Prussia, Galicia have been added to her territory. According to the Treaty of Versailles the fate of East Prussia and Upper Silesia was to be decided by plebiscite. East Prussia voted for Poland and, therefore, was assigned to her. But although Upper Silesia voted for

Germany, the whole of it could not be retained by her. The result of the plebiscite was that 62.3 per cent of the electorate voted in favour of Germany and 37.7 per cent in favour of Poland. In spite of this verdict, however, Upper Silesia was divided into two halves, and out of two million people about one million were handed over to Poland. Königshütte and Kattowitz, two important industrial centres, where 80 per cent of the population had voted in favour of Germany, were transferred to Poland. Of sixty anthracite coal mines of Upper Silesia Germany lost as many as fifty. But what is very much resented by the Germans is the creation of Danzig and the district around it as a 'free city' under the guarantee of the League of Nations. This was in order to give Poland an access to the sea. Danzig is purely German. This corridor has separated a part of Eastern Prussia from the west of Germany. Naturally it has been the

cause of much trouble between the two nations.

The freedom of Danzig is a myth. Poland is permitted to include this area within the Polish Customs frontier. Poland is to enjoy the use of all the water-ways and docks of the city. She must be given all port facilities. Her control over the railway system is complete. She also controls the postal and telegraphic communications with Danzig. In the sphere of foreign relations, Poland represents Danzig. Danzig is not so free after all as the name suggests.

Neither Danzig nor Germany can be happy over this arrangement. In the circumstances, a certain amount of friction between the local authorities on the one hand and Poland and the League on the other was perhaps inevitable. The forced separation of the German people of Danzig from the Reich made them ultra-nationalist. They have now

all become Nazi, and are demanding their return to the Fatherland. Since Hitler came to power—in spite of the Non-aggression Pact—Danzig has been a great danger spot in Europe. Nazi Germany may not like to have a major war at the present time, but the absorption of Danzig, made less difficult by the establishment of a Nazi Government in the Free City, should not be considered as a very remote possibility.

Even more serious is the situation in the "autonomous territory" of Memel. This German territory which was not finally disposed off by the Peace conference and remained under the Allies for three years was taken by force by the Lithuanian army in 1923.¹ It was a farce, no doubt. Imagine little Lithuania defying the combined strength of the Allied and Associated Powers. After some time Lithuania's title to the territory was recognized by the Con-

1. Toynebee, *Survey of International Affairs* (1920-23).

ference of Ambassadors (May 1924). This convention between the principal Allied Powers—Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan—provided that the Memel territory should ‘constitute, under the sovereignty of Lithuania, a unit enjoying legislative, judicial, administrative and financial autonomy’ within certain limits which were prescribed in a statute annexed to the Convention.

The application of the Memel Convention has given rise to numerous difficulties and disputes between Lithuania and Memel. According to the terms of the Convention, the Governor of the Memel territory is appointed by the Lithuanian Government, and he, in his turn, appoints the President of the Directorate. The result is dead-lock and constant friction between the Landtag, almost wholly German in composition, and the Directorate. Lithuania under the impulse of nationalism has consistently tried to make her authority felt in Memel. The

people and the legislature of Memel have equally consistently tried to oppose it. The people of Memel have been encouraged and supported by all the German Governments in their opposition to Lithuania. It was only natural that the Nazi regime should be even more sympathetic towards them than the moderate governments of Germany had been. Nazi Germany cannot forgive Lithuania for seizing Memel by force. The high-handed action, even if recognized and confirmed by the Principal Allied Powers, is considered by the Nazis as one of the gravest wrongs which must be undone. It is very significant that when Hitler offers peace to Europe he excludes from the offer, in addition to Russia, the state called Lithuania.

And now let us turn towards Russia, beginning with a short sketch of post-War Russo-German relations.

Shortly after the close of the World War and the conclusion of the Treaty

of Versailles, we find in Germany a powerful group of men which stood for an aggressive policy of retaliation in foreign affairs. They generally belonged to the parties of the Right. But although they stood for an aggressive foreign policy, they knew that disarmed Germany was no match even for a Poland or a Czechoslovakia, not to speak of France, the powerful western neighbour. The then Government of Germany, composed of the Socialists and the Middle parties, was opposed to an aggressive foreign policy, but was favourably inclined towards Russia.

The U. S. S. R. on her side was not only eager to propagate the doctrine of Communism, she was also in search of allies in order to combat the formidable coalition of her opponents. Moreover, she required the help of a highly industrialized nation for her own industrial development. In Germany she found an ideal comrade. Each country

required the help of the other. The Treaty of Rapallo was concluded between Russia and Germany in 1922. Included in its provisions were a mutual renunciation of reparations, renunciation by Germany of compensation for losses incurred by the Germans in Russia as a result of confiscation of private property, resumption of diplomatic relations, and mutual application of the 'most favoured nation' principle, etc.

On this treaty were based the subsequent friendly relations between the two countries. In 1924, however, the leaders of certain important German parties, such as the Socialist, the Democratic, the People's and the Centre Parties, came to recognize that a reorientation of German foreign policy was necessary.

For this change of view, Stresemann, who became Foreign Minister in 1924, was no doubt largely responsible. He recognized that an aggressive foreign policy was impossible, and all talk of

retaliation was meaningless. Russia was not in a position to offer any real help in the event of an international conflict. Communist uprisings in Bavaria and the Ruhr constituted another reason for his deprecation of too close a friendship with Revolutionary Russia. Besides, this friendship had not brought Germany any very substantial financial gains, which was contrary to what had been expected. Stresemann, therefore, struck a new note in German foreign policy. He now adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the ex-enemies, particularly towards France. The fruits of his endeavours were the conclusion of the Locarno Pact in 1925 and Germany's entry into the League of Nations in 1926.

Germany had now decided in favour of conciliation with the Western Powers, but at the same time she could not afford to antagonize Russia. Because of Russian friendship, Germany was in a position to insist on and carry through some of her

demands *vis-a-vis* the Western Powers. She could exploit Russian friendship and threaten the Powers with the reversal of her foreign policy. In short, Germany was trying to be on good terms with the Western Powers on the one hand and with Soviet Russia on the other. But it was not an easy task.

Soviet eyes saw in this dual policy of Germany a distinct sign of her drift from Russia. By the end of 1924 Russia had recognized the futility of her efforts to create a communist revolution in Germany. The Locarno Pact and the entry of Germany into the League made the relations between the two countries very cool indeed. But a complete break was not regarded as desirable by either of the parties. Russia still favoured a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, though not with earlier enthusiasm. Germany refused to dance to the Soviet tune, but at the same time she carefully avoided being drawn into any hostile

combination against Russia. Such relations continued until the beginning of 1933 when Hitler became all-powerful in Germany.

War with Russia is one of the most fundamental items in Hitler's programme. Repeatedly in his autobiography he mentions Russia as the inevitable foe. He calls her the "bestial" and "blood-stained" enemy. He takes Wilhelm II to task for the pre-War German policy. Germany ought to have allied herself with Great Britain in order to fight Russia. "We national Socialists," he says, "have deliberately drawn a line under the pre-War tendency of our foreign policy. We are where they were six hundred years ago. We stem the Germanic stream towards the South and West of Europe and turn our eyes eastwards.....Fate itself seems to wish to give us our direction. When fate abandoned Russia to Bolshevism it robbed the Russian people of the educated class which once

created and guaranteed their existence as a State."

Not only Hitlers' "federal" plan involves war with Russia, but he is looking covetously to the grain fields of Ukraine and the mineral resources of Siberia. "Germany", he says, "is not in the position of the Bolshevik Jew who possesses a superfluity of land. If we possessed the Urals, Siberia and the wheat-fields of Ukraine, then Germany under National Socialist leadership would be swimming in plenty instead of having to fight for her existence."

Herr Hitler has publicly reaffirmed his policy towards Russia which he calls 'our old enemy, the arch-enemy of humanity.' He seems to be prepared to subordinate all other aims of his to this aim—the crushing of Russia. He offered not long ago a peace pact even to France ; but with Russia there can be no peace.

The pact of 1936 between Germany and Japan, in spite of assurance to the

contrary, is clearly a move against Russia. Germany is organizing an anti-Russian bloc, of which Italy is also a member. Whether Italy can be depended upon under all circumstances is doubtful. But the alliance between Germany and Japan seems to be quite natural. It means that in case of War, Russia will have to fight on both the eastern and western fronts.

It may take long before Germany's Continental ambitions are fulfilled. But there can be no doubt that Germany's influence in Central and Eastern Europe is increasing. For most of these countries Germany has already become the dominant European Power. Even the solidarity of the Little Entente seems to have broken down. Rumania and Jugoslavia are moving towards Germany and away from France. There are strong pro-Nazi elements in both these countries. The economic penetration of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe carried on by Dr. Schacht is but

a prelude to the extension of political influence. "*Drang nach Osten*" is not a dead formula.

The Nazis, under the influence of Hitler, demanded the establishment of a land-Empire. They were in favour of expansion "towards the east", and were indifferent, if not actually hostile, to colonial expansion. Since the beginning of 1936, however, we find them demanding the return of German colonies. To "federalism" is now added "colonialism."

The Nazi interest in colonial affairs is of recent origin. Before October 1935 when a Colonial Exhibition was held at Hanover and when the Italian invasion of Abyssinia began, there was hardly any talk about colonies in Nazi circles. While unveiling a memorial to Dr. Peters, General von Epp referred to the invasion of Abyssinia by Italy as a hint to Germany. He urged that Germany was entitled to receive back her colonies. The book of Dr. Bauer, entitled '*Kolonien*

oder nicht,' published in 1935 with an introduction by Dr. Schacht, also seems to have influenced Herr Hitler.¹

The first public pronouncement of the Führer on the question of colonies was made in January (1936) before the Nazi students in Munich.² He declared that colonies were acquired by right of might. Europe needed raw materials and colonies, and by the heroic conception of life the white race was destined to rule.

Since then the German Minister for Propaganda is carrying on a regular campaign in the Press for the return of the colonies. The German Colonial Society has now renewed its activities. The climax of this movement for the restoration of the colonies was reached when, in September 1936, Herr Hitler, characterising the attitude of British

1. Sir C. Alexander Harris in *The Quarterly Review*, October 1936.

2. *The Statesman*, January 28, 1936.

statesmen towards German expansion, referred to the famous question of Marie Antoniette, "Why don't they eat cake?" when people said they had no bread.

This change in the attitude of Hitler and the Nazis seems to be due to the unhappy economic situation of the country and the influence of Dr. Schacht and General von Epp, specially of the former. Dr. Schacht who belongs to the old German Conservative Party and who is in charge of National Economics is a firm believer in the usefulness of the colonies to a country so short of raw materials and foreign exchange as Germany.

It was in 1926 that he said: "The fight for raw material plays the most important part in world politics, an even greater role than before the War..... Germany's only solution is her acquisition of colonies." He has consistently held the view that the economic recovery

1. Quoted by Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*.

of Germany is impossible without the restoration of colonies. Dr. Schacht is the man who is financing German re-armament. He has made himself indispensable to Hitler. He is in fact the only member of the Government, who has the courage to criticize, even publicly, the conduct of the Nazi Party. General von Epp must also be considered as one of the influential men in Germany. He is the Governor of Bavaria and the life and soul of the German colonial association.

The same old arguments—over-population, need for markets, shortage of raw materials and foodstuffs—are being put forward by Germans to-day.

Germany is a thickly populated country, with 65 million people. The density of population in Germany is about the same as that in England ; but England, in the words of General Goering, has the whole world as a colony. Germany, on the other hand, is a 'Volk ohne

Raum," a 'nation without space' to live.

But it is interesting to note that the people who complain that they are too many and that their country cannot support them are doing all that lies in their power to increase their number. The Nazis have adopted a definite population policy. They have imitated the Fascists in this respect, with the difference that they are even more thorough.

There are two aspects of the Nazi population policy : qualitative and quantitative¹. The object of the first is to prevent the birth of children of an "inferior" type. This has been done by the Law for Protection of the Hereditary Fitness of the German People, by the Law for Preventing the Reproduction of Persons with Hereditary Diseases, and by the Law for maintaining the Purity of the German Blood. But perhaps more

1. The name of a book.

2. Alfred Mensel, *National Socialism and the Family* in the *Sociological Review*, April, 1936.

important for the world is the quantitative aspect of Nazi population policy. First of all measures have been taken to stop the prevention of pregnancy and birth. Advertisement and sale of contraceptives have been wholly prohibited. More severe punishment is now assigned for abortion. Apart from these negative measures, the Nazi State is encouraging marriage and child-birth and is giving financial assistance to large families. Grants are made to young couples who want to marry. Subsidies are paid to persons with large families. Property and inheritance taxes in their case have been lowered and railway fares reduced. The world was amused to learn that Herr Goering had sent a congratulatory telegram to a woman in Prussia on the birth of a quadruplet.

Yet, Dr. Schacht describes Germany's lack of space as "a nightmare",¹ and

1. In a speech at the Geographical and Statistical Society at Frankfort on December 9, 1936.

Germany demands colonies because of over-population !

Germany must find new markets for her manufactured goods. During the last few years all the nations including Great Britain, that land of free trade, have adopted a policy of protection and "selfish exclusionism".¹ They have raised high tariff walls against imports. International trade, as a consequence, has been considerably reduced. Germany is not the only country to suffer from this policy, but she has been a greater sufferer than those countries which are either large and self-sufficient or possess vast empires.

Shortage of foodstuffs is given as another justification for the restoration of the German colonies. There is a general scarcity of food in Germany to-day. There is shortage of beef and butter in particular, which has compelled the German Government to introduce

1. *The Round Table*, December 1936.

the system of rationing, (December 1936). The Nazis are trying to shift the blame to the mistaken agricultural policy of pre-Nazi Governments. It is perhaps even more due to the present Nazi policy. "Fundamentally, the food shortage seems to be the outward and visible sign of the employment for capital investment (including rearmament) of an unreasonably high proportion of the national income." To the Nazi policy of Self-sufficiency also must be assigned a part of the blame for the shortage of foodstuffs. It is difficult to justify the continuance of restrictions on imports despite the acute shortage of foodstuffs. For reasons of 'self-sufficiency' uneconomic agriculture is being encouraged.

Anyhow the fact remains that Germany at the present time is oppressed by a serious food problem. Nazi leaders are fervently appealing to the German people to endure this hardship. "The

1. *The Economist*, November 30, 1935.

Führer," said Goering, "does not butter his meat. What he can do, you can." The German people, when confronted with the awkward question, 'what would they prefer—butter or liberty?', naturally answer: 'liberty'. Dr. Goebbels, the Nazi Minister for Propaganda, once informed his audience that butter and foodstuffs were not as important as guns. "We can well do without butter," he said, "but not without guns, because butter would not help us if we were to be attacked one day".

In the propaganda for the restoration of the German colonies particular stress is laid on the shortage of raw materials. Many of the well known German leaders have pointed out in their speeches and writings that this problem must be solved to the satisfaction of Germany because "it was a necessary preliminary to the restoration of sound world economy."

Dr. Schacht, in a recent speech (December 1936) at the Geographical and

Statistical Society, Frankfort, said that lack of raw materials was even greater than the lack of foodstuffs. Germany's existence, he continued, could not be secured by commercial agreements, and her position would remain an element of revolution in the European situation unless remedied.

"We want a share of the world's raw material sources, and we shall get them," declared General Goering in a speech on the new Four Year Plan, (October 28, 1936). About the same time, the German Minister of Finance, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, made a declaration in which he said: "We can never renounce the demand that the problem of the just distribution of raw materials should be dealt with and solved." He said that therein lay the key to the colonial question.

Nations which are in a happier position than Germany tell her that there is no need of possessing colonies

for the sake of raw materials and foodstuffs. These things may be had in plenty, provided you pay for them.. But apart from considerations of war, Germany is short of foreign exchange. General Goering and Dr. Goebbels, in their speeches, have referred scathingly to the suggestion that Germany should buy raw materials. "We would", said General Goering, "if they had not stolen our gold by reparations". Perhaps the economists would not agree with the reason given by the General but they would at least recognize that Germany has no money. It may be that Germany's own policy is responsible for the shortage of foreign exchange, but the fact remains that she has no money to buy raw materials and foodstuffs. Dr. Goebbels described as "an impudent argument" the statement that Germans could buy raw materials. "Did the English writer believe," he said, "that Germans were so stupid that they did not know that they

could not buy raw materials without foreign exchange? In due course they must buy raw materials, and if they had not got them at home they must be given a share in the world's wealth."

This is why Germany requires, in the words of General von Epp, "raw material producing colonial territory in which its own currency is in circulation".

Shortage of raw materials and food-stuffs has become so serious that after other methods of control had proved ineffective, Herr Hitler announced the famous Four Year Plan of raw material self-sufficiency at the Party-Congress at Nuremberg (1936). The execution of the Plan was placed in the hands of General Goering, the Prime Minister of Prussia and Reich Air Minister.

In his decree Herr Hitler said that the realization of the Plan demands a united direction of all the forces of the nation and the co-ordination of all the competent authorities in party and state.

General Goering has been given extensive power of issuing decrees and orders for the execution of the Plan.

Apart from economic considerations, purely political and sentimental considerations play an important part in the present agitation in Germany for the return of its colonies. The Aryan superman resents the idea of his exclusion from the work of civilization in the backward countries of the world. The Nazis believe in their racial superiority, and in the right of the white race to rule over the world. It is the white man's burden. It is his destiny.

That Germany has been a militarist and therefore an imperialist country is well known. Her philosophers have eulogised war. Was it not Hegel who said that 'The health of a state generally displays itself, not in the calm of peace, but in the movement of war'. Nietzsche exhorted his fellow-countrymen 'to live

1. Hegel, *Der Staat*, German Edition, 1924, p. 102.

dangerously', and exalted power for its own sake. Heinrich Treitschke, the Hohenzollern historian-philosopher, exploited the idea of national sovereignty to combat the theory of international law and world peace.

Much has been written and said on Prussianism and its militarist character, and it need not be repeated. Nazism, too, is undoubtedly militant in temper. The present rulers of Germany not only glorify war, but are making unprecedented preparations for it. Throughout Hitler's autobiography can be traced the central idea of war. "It must be thoroughly understood that the lost lands will never be won back by solemn appeals to the good God, nor by pious hopes in any League of Nations, but only by force of arms". Thus Hitler in *My Struggle*. Ewald Banse, in his preface to '*Raum und Volk im Weltkriege*', says without the least hesitation: "The Third Reich, as we dream of it—from the Flanders

coast to the Raab, from Memel to the Adige and the Rhone—can only be born in blood and iron”¹. War is no longer conceived as a measure of self-defence ; in Nazi ideology it seems to be the end of statecraft itself.

It has also been suggested that Hitler may be after all following in the footsteps of Bismarck. Perhaps Herr Hitler has raised the colonial question “to sap the moral strength of great Britain’s position, to sow discord between the colonial and the non-colonial Powers among Germany’s neighbours, and to confuse and divide British public opinion,”² and, we may add, to distract the minds of the German people from domestic ills.

These are the possible explanations of Germany’s claim to “colonial equality of rights.”

Is there any chance of Germany receiving back her colonies by peaceful

1. An English translation of the book is available *Germany Prepares for War*, 1934.

2. *The Round Table*, December 1936.

means ? Will the League of Nations be prepared to transfer some of the mandated territories to Germany ? And even if the League be so inclined, will the mandatory States tolerate it ? These questions are difficult to answer.

So far as we can judge from the present circumstances, it seems impossible that any of the mandatory Powers would willingly part with any portion of the territories assigned to it. Responsible British statesmen have already given Germany to understand that the question of handing over any colonies to Germany cannot arise under any circumstances, and the South Africa Minister of Defence has given a categorical reply to the German demands : "In no circumstances can South Africa or Great Britain envisage the return of either Tanganyika or South-West Africa to Germany."

A return of the colonies by peaceful means does not seem to be possible. But

1. Mr. Pirow in a statement on Aug. 12, 1936.

it does not preclude the possibility of what the *Round Table* has called "non-territorial expansion"¹ of Germany in Africa. Germany may be permitted to share in some of the benefits which colonies confer, as Sir Samuel Hoare pointed out in his Geneva Speech of September 1935. Thereby the economic grievances of Germany will be largely removed. We are not very hopeful, however, that an agreement of this type will actually be concluded between the *Haves* and the *Have-nots*; for imperialism, to be true to itself, must remain selfish. And even if the agreement does come into existence, there is no guarantee that the *Have-nots* will finally give up their demand for territorial expansion. Imperialism is seldom satisfied.

1. *The Round Table*, December 1936.

APPENDIX I

Area of the *Hares* and the *Hare-nots*

	Area of the mother country (sq. miles)	Per cent of world's area	Area of imperial possessions (sq. miles)	Per cent of world's area ●	Ratio between the areas of the mother country and impe- rial possessions
Great Britain	88,745	'17	12,954,896	25'5	1 : 144
France	212,659	'41	4,436,748	8'8	1 : 20'5
Belgium	11,775	'02	918,000	1'78	1 : 78
Holland	12,579	'02	787,990	1'52	1 : 61
Portugal	35,490	'06	812,576	1'57	1 : 23
U. S. A.	3,026,789	5'85	711,618	1'38	1 : '25
European Russia	3,531,728	6'79	4,710,193	9'14	1 : 13
		*	*		*
Japan	147,592	'29	{ (1) 127,087	'25	1 : '8
Italy	119,713	'23	{ (2) 575,701	'49	1 : 3'8
			{ (3) 873,231	1'69	1 : 7
Germany	181,699	'35	{ (4) 1,223,121	2'39	1 : 10'3
			—	—	1 : 0

1 and 2. Before and after the conquest of Manchuria respectively.

3 and 4. Before and after the conquest of Abyssinia respectively.

APPENDIX II

Population of the *Haves* and the *Have-nots*

	Population of the mother country	Per cent of world's population	Population of imperial posses- sions	Per cent of world's population	Ratio between the populations of the mother country and imperial posses- sions
Great Britain	44,888,377	2'17	451,456,179	21'77	1 : 10'1
France	41,824,923	2'02	63,609,872	3'07	1 : 1'5
Belgium	8,247,950	'40	9,485,091	'45	1 : 1'1
Holland	8,290,389	'40	60,970,239	2'94	1 : 7'3
Portugal	6,825,883	'33	8,913,071	'43	1 : 1'3
U. S. A.	122,775,046	5'92	15,129,284	'73	1 : '12
European Russia	133,709,700	6'45	32,008,700	1'55	1 : '26
		*	*		*
Japan	68,194,900	3'29	{ (1) 27,343,675 (2) 61,588,625	1'30 2'99	1 : '4 1 : '9
Italy	42,621,000	2'05	{ (3) 2,484,638 (4) 7,984,638	'12 '39	1 : '05 1 : '18
Germany	66,044,161	3'13	nil	—	1 : 0

1 and 2. Before and after the conquest of Manchuria respectively.

3 and 4. Before and after the annexation of Abyssinia respectively.

